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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters on the industrial organization of mortgage markets
in the United States. Both chapters share a theme of studying costly consumer search
and imperfect information in mortgage markets, and how these mechanisms affect market
structure and welfare.
In the first chapter, titled “Consumer Search Costs in U.S. Mortgage Markets”, I focus
on estimating the distribution of consumer search costs in the market for government-backed
mortgages in the US during the period from September 2013 to March 2015. Costly search
explains two observations about U.S. mortgage markets: borrowers in the US shop from very
few lenders, and price dispersion exists even for homogeneous and insured mortgages. To
estimate the effects of costly search, I adapt the Hortasu and Syverson (2004) search model
to mortgage markets. I estimate the distribution of consumer search costs in each U.S.
state using recent data on government-insured mortgages. I find that estimated search costs
are large; a median borrower would face a search cost equivalent to about $40 in monthly
repayment. At the state-level, search cost magnitude is related positively to household
income and age and negatively to years of education.
I solve counterfactual scenarios in order to study the relationship between search costs and
welfare. Compared to the full information scenario, the presence of costly consumer search
decreases social welfare by about $600 in monthly repayment per borrower. This decrease
i
in welfare occurs because under costly search borrowers are matched with lower quality
lenders and spend resources on searching. At the national level, this decrease corresponds to
approximately $35 million per-month. Reductions in search costs would raise social welfare
monotonically. A 10% reduction in search cost may raise social welfare by as much as $130
per borrower per month. These findings support recent policies that aim to reduce search
costs of mortgage borrowers.
In the second chapter, titled “Price Discrimination in U.S. Mortgage Markets”, I examine
the existence of price discrimination generated by costly consumer search in the market
for mortgages. Positive search costs affect borrowers’ demand-elasticity by changing their
willingness to engage in mortgage shopping, the consideration set of lenders, as well as their
outside option when negotiating with a particular lender. Consequently, price discrimination
may arise as lenders have an incentive to vary the markup based on directly or indirectly
observed search costs.
I develop a stylized model of consumer search in mortgage markets where firms charge
optimal prices that depend on borrowers’ search cost level. The model produces testable
restrictions on the conditional quantile function of observed transacted rates. Specifically,
under price discrimination a quantile regression of transacted rates on any loan observable
should produce coefficients that either vary monotonically or are equal to a constant across
quantiles, depending on whether the observable is affiliated with marginal cost, search cost,
or both.
Using the data on insured Federal Housing Agency loans where price variation is not
driven by default risk, I run a quantile regression of transacted interest rates on a set of loan
observables, including borrower’s credit score, original principal balance, and loan-to-value
ratio, among others. I find that predictions of the theoretical model are satisfied for all loan
observables under consideration, and price discrimination created by costly consumer search
is likely to exist in U.S. mortgage markets. For policy makers aiming to increase competition
ii
and welfare in the mortgage market, these results suggest that not only the number of lenders
but also the magnitude of consumer search costs is relevant.
The two chapters are independent but complement each other. Each examines a separate
hypothesis that the other assumes away. In Chapter 1, lenders are viewed as differing in
quality, and their pricing decision depends on loan observables only through the marginal
cost channel: any changes in observables affect only the marginal cost of lending and are
then passed on to price in a one-to-one manner. In contrast, chapter 2 models lenders
as homogeneous firms but allows loan observables to be informative of consumer-specific
search costs. As a result, optimal markups vary with loan observables through the effects of
observables both on marginal costs and on search costs. The combination of the two chapters
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Chapter 1
Consumer Search Costs in U.S.
Mortgage Markets
1.1 Introduction
Mortgage borrowers in the United States shop from very few lenders. Recent survey data
show that nearly 80% of borrowers consider only two lenders or fewer prior to applying,
and 50% consider only one lender (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2015). The
small number of lenders that are considered is not due to a scarcity of lenders. In 2014,
for instance, there were a total of 7,062 registered mortgage lenders in the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act database. One important explanation for the lack of shopping activity is that
borrowers face considerable search costs.
Despite the prevalence of online search engines, exact price quotes for mortgages are only
provided in a form called the Good-Faith Estimate (GFE), which the borrower typically
obtains after having filed and submitted an application. However, submitting an application
and acquiring the GFE incurs a certain cost on the borrower. The cost includes not only a
1
non-refundable application fee but also the value of time spent filling an application. There
are also implicit costs, such as the reduction in credit rating every time the borrower’s credit
report is assessed.
Market frictions created by costly consumer search, as described above, certainly hinder
the competitiveness of U.S. mortgage markets. Unfortunately, there are few estimates on the
magnitude of search frictions in this industry and the resulting effects on market welfare. The
welfare effects can be especially pronounced considering the enormous size of the market for
mortgage products in the US. In 2014, total mortgage debt outstanding exceeded 13 trillion
dollars, which corresponds approximately to 70% of U.S. annual GDP. Estimates of the
search cost distribution quantify an important feature of this industry that is useful for
policy evaluations.
This paper estimates the distribution of consumer search costs in an important segment
of U.S. mortgage markets and measures the impact of costly search on market welfare. In
many settings, price dispersion can be very informative about the search cost distribution.
For instance, in a market where firms and consumers are homogeneous apart from the vari-
ation in consumer search costs, the distribution of search costs can be recovered using only
observations of prices (Hong and Shum, 2006). This is possible partly because the expected
price saving from one more search, given the observed transacted price, provides a lower
bound for consumers’ search cost level.
In reality, some price dispersion in mortgage markets is driven by factors unrelated to
consumer search. Variation in the quality of service provided by lenders, such as the respon-
siveness of representatives, the speed of processing applications and brand reputations, can
drive price dispersion. Hence, the relevant quantity for the consumer’s search problem is
not the expected price saving but the expected utility gain, which accounts for both price
saving and quality gain that result from the marginal search. Perhaps more importantly,
the marginal cost of lending, which is predominantly related to borrowers’ default risks, may
2
also vary and create price dispersion.
I account for variation in lender quality by allowing vertical differentiation among profit-
maximizing lenders. Although the search cost distribution can be estimated without im-
posing structure on the firms (Honka, 2014), specifying a profit-maximizing supply side is
necessary to quantify effects of costly search on market welfare. Hence, I follow Hortaçsu and
Syverson (2004) and specify that lenders choose prices to maximize profit given the quality
distribution and the search cost distribution. By assuming that observed prices are profit-
maximizing, I can account for price dispersion that is due to quality differences and later
conduct counterfactual experiments where the price equilibrium is endogenously changed.
In order to alleviate variation in prices due to default risks, I focus on a subset of
mortgages that are government-backed. Unlike conventional mortgages, government-backed
mortgages provide lenders with insurance in the case of borrower default. The insurance
is administered through four separate government agencies that correspond to four types
of government-backed loans: the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department
of Veteran Affairs (VA), the Department of Agriculture (Rural Development (RD) loans),
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Permanent Indian Housing loans).
While only FHA loans feature full insurance, all the other types require at least a partial
insurance on the loan amount. Government-backed mortgages comprise about a third of all
mortgages in the US in terms of origination volume (Simkovic, 2013). As in Allen, Clark
and Houde (2014c) who study the Canadian mortgage market, the use of insured mortgages
in this chapter ensures observed price dispersion is less likely to be driven by heterogeneous
default risks.
I estimate the model using data on government-backed mortgages from October 2013
to March 2015 obtained from Ginnie Mae. The sample represents the full population of
government-backed mortgages that were originated in the US during this period. Consistent
with the presence of costly search, the sample displays a significant degree of price dispersion
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even though all sampled mortgages are insured. For example, for a 30-year mortgage with
a median loan amount of $120,000, a borrower at the 10th percentile of the interest rate
distribution is paying $71 less per month compared to a borrower at the 90th percentile. The
pattern of price dispersion holds regardless of whether monthly payments or interest rates
are used as the measure for price, and persists even after controlling for loan and lender
characteristics.
I estimate the search cost distribution separately in each U.S. state. By treating each
state as a separate market, I can examine how state-level demographic factors relate to the
search cost distribution. Establishing the role of demographics in estimating search costs is
useful for understanding the exact nature of search costs in this market. Furthermore, since
the relationship between search cost magnitudes and market prices is not well established,
both theoretically and in the context of this particular market, I perform counterfactual
simulations to characterize how search cost reductions would affect price level and price
dispersion.
Estimates of search cost magnitudes are measured on a per-month basis. As in Allen,
Clark and Houde (2014a), this per-month measurement unit follows directly from the speci-
fication of marginal cost and utility in per-month dollars. Two borrowers who have the same
per-month search cost need not have the same total search cost, because they may plan to
hold the mortgage for a different time length. Holding total search cost constant, a borrower
who plans to refinance soon would have a higher per-month search cost and would search
less. Intuitively, she has less time to benefit from finding a low monthly price and thus have
less incentive to search hard. In contrast, a borrower who plans to hold the mortgage for a
longer period of time would have a lower per-month search cost, would benefit more from
finding a low monthly price, and would search harder.
In the context of mortgage markets, a per-month unit is more empirically relevant than
a total unit, because prices in this industry are quoted not in absolute terms but in monthly
4
and annual terms. For example, knowing that the total search cost of a borrower is $3000
does not reveal much about her search behavior, because how long she plans to hold the
mortgage is usually her private information. On the other hand, knowing that her per-
month search cost is $30, one can reasonably predict what her cut-off level of utility is,
which lenders would be acceptable to her, and how many times she would be expected to
search.
Estimation results confirm that search costs are sizable in this industry. Because interest
rates are quoted on an annual or monthly basis, search costs are also estimated with the
same units. Across all 51 markets (including Washington, DC), the median search cost
level is about $40 per month of mortgage repayment. A median borrower therefore stops
searching when the expected utility gain of the marginal search, which results from either
finding a lower price or a higher quality lender, becomes less than $40. In order to quantify
the welfare effects of costly search, I solve for welfare changes in a range of counterfactual
scenarios where search costs are reduced discretely from 5% to 100%. I find that social
welfare increases monotonically with the degree of search cost reduction. In the context of
the model, there are two separate sources of welfare changes when search costs are reduced:
first, borrowers are matched with better quality lenders, and second, borrowers spend less
resources on searching before finding a match. The counterfactual results show that in the
full information case, social welfare is increased by approximately $600 per borrower per
month because of these effects. At the national level, this welfare reduction corresponds to
about $35 million per month.
Demographic factors are found to be related to the magnitude of search costs at the
state-level. In particular, search costs are increasing in household income and age, and are
decreasing in years of education. These results are consistent with Goldman and Johans-
son (1978)’s hypothesis that consumer search costs reflect both opportunity costs and the
cognitive and information-processing ability of individuals. Policies that aim to educate
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consumers (i.e., improve the information-processing ability) is likely to be beneficial in re-
ducing search costs and improving consumer welfare, although one should be aware of the
substantial difficulty in using financial education to improve consumers’ financial outcomes
(Hastings, Madrian and Skimmyhorn, 2013).
Counterfactual simulations predict an increase in average absolute markup charged by
lenders in most state-level markets. The incentive to charge a low price and capture a larger
share of consumers with low search costs becomes less and less relevant as more consumers
become “shoppers” with low search costs. Search cost reductions also have a monotonic
impact on the dispersion of posted prices. As search costs are reduced, in most markets
dispersion of posted prices will increase, with the largest dispersion occurring in the case of
complete elimination of search costs.
Results presented in this chapter treat search costs as a broadly-defined term. If borrow-
ers search using an optimal stopping rule, I find that their search costs have to be very large
in order to rationalize the pattern of prices and market shares observed in each geographical
market. However, if borrowers are confused about the mortgage market, as Woodward and
Hall (2012) suggest, they may stop shopping at an earlier than optimal point. Furthermore,
consumers may not be informed about the distribution of posted prices, a requirement for
optimal shopping. As discussed in Grubb (2015), there is a growing literature in behavioral
industrial organization that explain why consumers fail to shop for the best price. In the
context of this chapter, estimated search costs should therefore be interpreted as encompass-
ing both the cost of shopping as well as other behavioral limitations that prevent consumers
from implementing an optimal shopping program.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, along with Woodward and Hall
(2012), this chapter is the one of the first to provide estimates of consumer search costs in
the market for mortgages in the United States. Because of the prevalence of search frictions
in this industry, systematic estimation of their magnitudes is useful for policy analysis. Sec-
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ond, in addition to Nishida and Remer (2015), this chapter is one of the few studies that
make the connection between the distribution of search cost and demographic characteris-
tics. The estimated relationship between demographics and search costs is informative for
understanding the nature of search costs. Third, through the use of a structural model, the
paper performs counterfactual simulations to estimate the effects of costly consumer search
on welfare. The counterfactual results establish the relevance of costly search in mortgage
markets, and help predict changes in welfare, price dispersion, and price level following
policies of search cost reductions.
1.2 Related Literature
In terms of methodology, this research is most closely related to the work by Carlson and
McAfee (1983), Hong and Shum (2006), and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004). Carlson and
McAfee (1983) provide the theoretical foundation with a model of equilibrium price disper-
sion due to consumer search.1 Hong and Shum (2006) develop a method to recover the search
cost distribution for a homogeneous product using only data on prices. Hortaçsu and Syver-
son (2004) build on these two papers to recover the search cost distribution of a vertically
differentiated product using prices and market shares. They apply their method to investi-
gate how search frictions create sizable price dispersion in the U.S. mutual funds industry.
In the mortgage search model presented in Section 1.4, transacted prices can be separated
into two components: the marginal cost of lending and lender’s absolute markup. This as-
sumption permits a relatively straightforward adaptation of the methodology employed by
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004).
A few papers also examine consumer search in mortgage markets. Woodward and Hall
(2012) study the use of brokers among borrowers using a sample of mortgages insured by
1For related theoretical models of consumer search, see the extensive review by Baye, Morgan and Scholten
(2006).
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the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The authors find that from the perspective of
a model of optimal shopping, the cost of contacting an additional broker is unreasonably
high. They conclude that borrowers are not shopping optimally and may be confused about
their broker’s incentives. A working paper by Allen et al. (2014a) studies consumer search
in the Canadian mortgage market. They implement an analysis at the lender-borrower
level, and find that search reduces consumer welfare by $20 per month of repayment per
consumer. Related papers by the same authors document price discrimination and the effects
of mergers on price dispersion among mortgage lenders in Canada. Allen et al. (2014c) run
quantile regressions of transacted rates on loan observables and find evidence consistent with
price discrimination caused by bargaining and negotiating. Allen, Clark and Houde (2014b)
examine the relationship between concentration and price dispersion, and find that mergers
reduce the dispersion of prices. The authors argue that the evidence supports the presence
of costly search in the Canadian mortgage market.
This paper shares similarities with a few empirical studies that quantify search costs in
markets other than that of mortgage products. Honka (2014) studies search in the auto
insurance industry, a market in which transacted prices vary according to consumer char-
acteristics. This feature is also shared by mortgage markets and does not readily permit
an adoption of the Hong and Shum (2006) method to recover search costs. Honka (2014)
circumvents this problem by regressing prices on characteristics and predicts a distribution
of price that each consumer faces. She finds that consumer search costs for automobile in-
surance plans range from $35 to $170 per search, with an average of about $40. Wildenbeest
(2011) looks at how vertical differentiation and consumer search could explain price disper-
sion among supermarkets in the United Kingdom. He finds that in this market most of the
dispersion in price can be attributed to product differentiation rather than consumer search.
The examination presented in Section 1.6.2 on the relationship between search cost magni-
tudes and state-level demographic factors is closely related to that of Nishida and Remer
(2015). Nishida and Remer (2015), studying the retail gasoline market, find that median
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household income is positively correlated with search costs.
1.3 Industry Background and Data Sources
1.3.1 Overview of the Market for Government-backed Mortgages
I study a sample of mortgages that are insured by the U.S. government. Lenders are pro-
tected from credit risk: in case of default they get a reimbursement from the government
for the portion of unpaid principal balance under insurance. Currently four different govern-
ment agencies are responsible for insuring mortgages: the Federal Housing Administration,
the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Loans originated under these programs are respectively
abbreviated as FHA, VA, RD, and PIH. Each of these programs targets a specific borrower
demographic and requires certain qualifications from the borrower. Only FHA loans cur-
rently require full insurance, while VA, RD, and PIH loans require a partial insurance on
the loan amount.
After origination, government-backed loans are securitized exclusively by Ginnie Mae.
The securitization process consists of pooling individual mortgage loans together to form a
mortgage-backed security, which can then be sold in the secondary mortgage market. In
terms of volume, government mortgages occupy a sizable part of new mortgage originations
in the United States. In 2010, for example, new issuances of securities backed by government
mortgages comprised a third of total mortgage-backed security issuances (Simkovic, 2013).
Because of Ginnie Mae’s participation in the secondary market, two different layers of pro-
tection exists in government-backed mortgages: government insurance that protects lenders
in case of borrower default, and the Ginnie Mae’s guaranty that protects investors in case
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of lender default. Over the course of a mortgage loan, lenders are typically responsible for
remitting monthly payments of principal and interest from borrowers to investors. There
is a risk of a lender defaulting on its remitting duty that investors must face. Ginnie Mae
provides a guaranty to investors and negates that risk.
1.3.2 Ginnie Mae Loan-Level and Lender-State-Level Data
I treat each state as a separate market and perform the analysis at the lender-state level. I
therefore collapse the primary dataset, the Ginnie Mae loan-level data, from the loan-level
to the lender-state level. Below is a brief description of both original and collapsed datasets.
The Ginnie Mae loan-level data consists of the population of government-backed mort-
gages securitized by Ginnie Mae from October 2013 to March 2015 (Ginnie Mae, 2013).
This dataset includes several loan and borrower characteristics, as well as the state where
the property is located and the lender who underwrites the loan. In table 1.1, I provide
a description of key variables included in this dataset. A key advantage of this dataset is
the inclusion of data on the mortgage-backed security for which each loan is serving as the
collateral. This inclusion permits merging the Ginnie Mae data with the Bloomberg data,
described below, in order to estimate the marginal cost of lending.
I make several restrictions on the sample. First, I focus on new home purchases only
and drop loans that are refinances (about 30% of the sample), since borrowers who refinance
are likely to belong to a different market segment and therefore have different search costs
compared to new homebuyers. I drop adjustable-rate mortgages (2% of the sample) in
order to achieve a more tractable analysis. I also focus on loans with a common 30 year
amortization period and drop those with a shorter term (5% of the sample). For each state,
I also drop small lenders who represent less than 1% market share, presuming that these
lenders are local and do not compete at the statewide scale. Lastly, I drop loans where
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Table 1.1: Description of Key Variables in the Ginnie Mae Loan-Level Dataset
Variables Description
Bank/Lender Characteristics
Lender ID Unique identifier and the name of the lender
Agency Agency that provides the insurance (FHA, VA, RD,
PIH)
Mortgage Contract Characteristics
Loan Purpose Identifier whether the loan is a purchase or a refinance
Origination Date Month in which the loan is originated
Loan Term Length of the loan, in months
Interest Rate Transacted interest rate (in basis points)
Original Principal Balance Dollar amount of the loan
Loan-to-Value Loan amount divided by property sell value
Credit Score Minimum borrower credit score
Total Debt Expense Ratio Ratio of all debts to the borrower’s income
Buy Down Status Identifier whether the borrower purchases discount
points
Mortgage Insurance Rate Mortgage insurance premium rate (FHA loans only)
Borrower Characteristics
Number of Borrowers Number of borrowers in the contract
First Time Homebuyer Identifier for first-time homebuyer
Property Characteristics
State State where the property is located
Number of Units Number of units in the property
MBS Characteristics
Coupon Rate - Pool Coupon (interest) rate on the MBS into which the loan
is pooled
Source: Ginnie Mae Loan-Level Data, September 2013 - March 2015.
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the borrower decides to purchase discount points (0.8% of the sample), since the transacted
interest rate in those cases is not simply the outcome from a search equilibrium. After these
adjustments, the sample consists of 1,091,897 loan-level observations.
In collapsing the loan data, I compute the mean interest rate, monthly payment, and
loan amount at the lender-state level.In total there are 51 markets, one for each of the 50
states and Washington, D.C. On average, about 20 lenders are present in each market, with
Alaska having the least number of lenders (13), and Connecticut having the most (27). In
terms of market size, Texas is the largest, with nearly 11% of all observed loans originated
in this state. North Dakota is the smallest; only 0.2% of loans are originated here.
In Table 1.2, I present an example of this lender-state-level data for five lenders with
the largest market share in Texas. Interest rate, monthly payment, and loan amount are
calculated as the mean for all loans that a particular lender originates in the state of Texas.
There is a considerable dispersion in the transacted interest rates across lenders, suggesting
the presence of consumer search costs. As will be shown later, dispersion also exists when
we use absolute markups, instead of transacted rates, as the measurement for prices.













Wells Fargo 429.30 830.04 168.36 31,760 29.71
(32.84) (350.76) (72.38)
PennyMac 422.73 871.81 178.20 10,394 9.72
(28.31) (324.06) (67.40)
US Bank 454.68 716.14 141.35 7,610 7.12
(42.52) (251.02) (53.12)
USAA Federal Bank 395.66 1,003.37 211.25 5,007 4.68
(27.03) (413.56) (86.74)
JPMorgan Chase 439.54 833.20 167.13 4,982 4.66
(30.87) (381.76) (78.45)
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for Interest Rate, Monthly Payment and Loan Amount.
12
1.3.3 Bloomberg Data on MBS Yield
To control for the marginal cost of lending, I collect yield rates of mortgage-backed securities
from Bloomberg. These yield rates are obtained on a monthly basis from October 2013 to
March 2015. In this section, I describe the origination process of a mortgage and argue that
the MBS yield rates provide a good approximation for the marginal cost of lending.
In mortgage markets, the funds used to finance loans usually come not from lenders
but from investors in the secondary market. This channeling of funds from investors to
homebuyers is carried out in several steps. First, a mortgage lender sells a mortgage-backed
security to investors in a forward-market called the TBA market. This sale essentially
amounts to a promise that the lender would deliver the MBS to investors at a given future
date. At the time of this forward market transaction, the face value, the coupon rate, and
the price of the mortgage-backed security are determined. Second, the lender proceeds to
originate loans and repackage them with Ginnie Mae to form a mortgage-backed security.
This step typically takes two to three months. Finally, after all the underlying loans are
originated and the MBS is created, the lender delivers the MBS to investors at the previously
agreed delivery date. A more extensive discussion on the institutional details of the TBA
market can be found in Vickery and Wright (2013).
The lender is typically responsible for the servicing of loans. For our purpose servicing
can be viewed as consisting of two duties: collecting monthly payments from homebuyers,
and remitting part of those payments to investors who hold the MBS. The size of the monthly
payments is determined by the loan amount and the interest rate of the mortgage contract;
similarly, the size of remittances is determined by the face value and the coupon rate of
the MBS. The mortgage lender, who acts as a middle-man between the homebuyer and the
investor, can keep the difference between the monthly payments and the remittances.
The origination process, as described above, implies that in order to originate a mortgage,
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a lender borrows funds from the secondary market. For each dollar of borrowed funds, the
yield rate of the mortgage-backed security provides a measure for the cost of borrowing. I
therefore use yield rates to calculate the marginal cost of lending in Section 1.5.2. Yield
rates of mortgage-backed securities have been used to measure the marginal cost of lending
in other studies as well, for example Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014).
1.3.4 State-Level Demographics from the American Community
Survey
In order to estimate the relationship between the search cost distribution and state-level
demographics, I utilize data from the American Community Survey (ACS) on household
income, age, and education in 2014. With the exception of Nishida and Remer (2015), most
previous studies on consumer search do not draw the connection between search costs and
demographics in order to explain search cost heterogeneities across markets. The ACS is
an annual statistical survey conducted by the US Census Bureau, with the primary aim of
determining how federal and state funds should be distributed. Nishida and Remer (2015),
in a study of the retail gasoline market, also employ the ACS and find that the mean and
variance of household income is closely related to the mean and variance of the search cost
distribution.
In Table 1.3, I present summary statistics of state-level demographics in 2014. There are
51 observations for each variable, corresponding to the total number of markets. The ACS
does not report standard deviations directly but provides the number of observations that
fall into a certain brackets of income, age and education. Following the standard exercise
of finding standard deviations for grouped data, I compute the standard deviations for
household income, age, and education, assuming the mid-point in each bracket is the mean
for the sub-population belonging in that bracket. I report the mean for household income
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and years of education; as for age, since a mean is not readily provided by the ACS, I report
the median.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of State-level Demographics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household Income - Mean 51 72,778 12,136 54,881 104,615
Household Income - Std. Dev. 51 57,308 6,630 48,171 77,513
Age - Median 51 37.73 2.38 29.90 43.50
Age - Std. Dev. 51 22.95 0.50 21.08 23.69
Years of Education - Mean 51 12.96 0.25 12.45 13.72
Years of Education - Std. Dev. 51 2.12 0.09 1.86 2.41
Source: The American Community Survey, 2014.
1.3.5 Price Dispersion, Cost Differentials and Firm Heterogeneity
Although loan-level observations are not required for the estimation of search cost distribu-
tions, their presence allows us to investigate how interest rate dispersion is driven by cost
differentials and firm heterogeneity. Following Lin and Wildenbeest (2013) and Sorensen
(2000), I compare the R2 values obtained from OLS regression of interest rates under three
specifications. The regression results are presented in Table 1.4.
In column (1), interest rates are regressed only on state and month fixed effects. If a mort-
gage is a homogeneous product, and there is no firm heterogeneity, the source of marginal
cost difference would come from time and location varying conditions in the secondary mar-
ket. Hence, controlling for state and monthly dummies should explain most, if not all, the
variations in interest rates. With the R2 at 20%, however, this case is not likely.
In column (2), I allow marginal cost to also be varying across borrowers. Even though
loans are insured and default risks are mitigated, prepayment risks may still differ across
borrowers. I account for borrower-specific cost differences by incorporating loan observables
into the regression. All loan observables are statistically significant, and the R2 is raised to
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Table 1.4: Price Dispersion, Cost Differentials and Firm Heterogeneity
Interest Rates (bps) (1) (2) (3)
Original Principal Balance -.0389*** -.0377***
(.0003) (.0003)
Loan-to-Value Ratio .1372*** .1307***
(.0051) (.0048)
Credit Score -.1718*** -.1448***
(.0006) (.0005)
Other Loan Observables No Yes Yes
Lender Dummies No No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,091,897 1,007,707 1,007,707
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.29 0.38
Source: Ginnie Mae Loan-Level Data, September 2013 - March
2015.
29%, suggesting that borrower-specific costs are relevant. In Section 1.4, I assume that these
loan observables affect only the marginal cost of lending and are captured by a borrower
idiosyncratic cost term denoted by ei.
In column (3), I add lender fixed effects to the regression. These fixed effects capture the
variations in transacted interest rates across lenders. Both consumer search and firm-level
quality differentiation may lead to dispersion at the lender-level, although the reduced-
form regressions do not allow discerning the two hypotheses separately. However, since all
lender fixed effects are statistically significant, search and lender differentiation is relevant in
determining the transacted interest rate distribution. The explanatory power of the model
also increases to nearly 40% once lender fixed effects are included.
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1.4 A Mortgage Search Model
1.4.1 Main Assumptions
The mortgage search model hinges on several key assumptions. First, borrowers search
only along the price dimension of their mortgage contract. All non-price dimensions of
the contract, such as the loan amount and the loan-to-value ratio, are determined outside
the model and are kept constant during the shopping occasion. This assumption is not
unrealistic since most borrowers do decide how much they want to borrow before shopping
for the lowest price. The decision to fix all non-price terms is also employed by Honka (2014)
in her study of consumer search in the U.S. auto insurance industry. I interpret price as the
monthly payment of the mortgage contract. The model is estimable regardless of whether
one chooses interest rate or monthly payment as the measure for price. However, using
monthly payment would yield more intuitive results, because estimated search costs would
be measured in dollars instead of basis points.
Second, borrowers visit lenders and gather price quotations sequentially. The sequential
search assumption is adopted because an accurate price quote can only be obtained from
the Good-Faith Estimate. At each sampled lender, the borrower files an application, obtains
a GFE, and decides whether to continue to search or not. For tractability, I assume the
sampling probability to be equal across lenders. It is possible to relax this assumption and
incorporate varying sampling probabilities into the model. Following Carlson and McAfee
(1983), I also assume that sampling occurs with replacement.
Third, lenders in each geographical market are vertically differentiated. Mortgage lenders
usually provide service of differing qualities. Higher quality lenders have better branding,
faster billing services, more responsive customer service, and swifter processing times. Be-
cause the Ginnie-Mae data only identify geographical locations up to the state level, I treat
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each state as a separate geographical market. Admittedly, finer location details would be
useful. However, because I drop small lenders with less than 1% of market shares from the
analysis (the data do not distinctly identify them), the remaining lenders presumably are
large and compete at the statewide level.
Following Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), I do not allow for horizontal differentiation.
The presence of horizontal differentiation along with heterogeneous search costs creates an
identification problem; when a borrower rejects a lender in favor of further search, the re-
jection can be attributed to both a low search cost or a low preference for that particular
lender. Horizontal differentiation may be particularly relevant if a borrower prefers a certain
lender over others because of the home-bank effect or geographical proximity.
I assume that lenders are profit-maximizing entities, with one exception. In each market,
the markup charged by the lender with the highest quality measure is taken as given. This
exception is reflected in the system of first-order equations in Section 1.5.1, where the number
of equations is one less than the number of lenders. This problem, also shared by Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2004), does not affect recovering the search cost distribution, but it implies
that the optimal markup vector solved in the counterfactual would be an approximation.
Finally, I assume that loan observables only affect the marginal cost of lending and not the
search cost of borrowers. As a consequence of this, lenders set price based on observables only
to the extent that they affect marginal cost. I also assume that marginal cost’s pass-through
to price is one-to-one. Lenders take the distribution of search costs as given, observe the
marginal cost that may be a function of loan observables, and charge a markup accordingly.
The assumption that observables do not affect search costs is relaxed in Chapter 2 where
I examine price discrimination. In Chapter 2, I show that even when loan observables are
informative about consumer search costs, the search model implies that changes in cost are




Following standard frameworks of consumer search, I posit that borrowers know the distri-
bution of indirect utility in their respective geographical market, but do not know exactly
which lender provides which level of utility. I specify the indirect utility that borrower i gets
from lender j as:
uij = δj − pij (1.1)
where pij is the monthly mortgage payment and δj is a lender fixed-effect that captures
quality differences. Since a borrower can only get one loan, the subscript i indexes both the
borrower and the loan.
I normalize the coefficient on monthly payment to -1. This formulation deviates from
standard models of vertical differentiation, in which an idiosyncratic willingness-to-pay term
αi precedes price. The varying willingness-to-pay is typically needed in standard models in
order to explain observed market shares; otherwise the firm providing the highest indirect
utility would have a 100% market share. Here, observed market shares are explained through
the presence of heterogeneous search costs. Because of uncertainties when sampling, not all
borrowers would sample the lender that provides the highest utility. The best lender would
not have a 100% market share, and even the worst lender is still chosen by some customers
with a high enough search cost (which prevents them from sampling again).
I separate monthly payments into two components according to the following equation:
pij = mci +mj (1.2)
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Here mci is the marginal cost of originating loan i. As shown in Section 1.3.5, the marginal
cost of lending is loan-specific. I calculate the marginal cost of lending in Section 1.5.2. The
termmj represents a lender-specific markup added on top of the marginal cost to compensate
lenders for their service of mortgage underwriting. In this specification, markup refers to an
absolute markup instead of the usual ratio of profit margin over cost. I assume that marginal
cost can be further separated into a constant term and a borrower-specific error:
mci = mci + ei (1.3)
The term ei reflects idiosyncratic effects of borrowers on transacted price. I interpret ei as
unobserved cost shocks that are realized only when the borrower comes into contact with
the lender, and are then passed on to the transacted price. Lenders observe mci for each of
their borrowers, while the econometrician observes only the average mci. I further assume
that, given the yield rate yi of the mortgage-backed security for which loan i serves as a
collateral and the vector of loan observables Xi, ei has a zero mean. Also, ei is independent
of search costs, so in equilibrium there is no selection on ei across lenders. Thus, we have:
E[ei | yi, Xi, j] = 0 (1.4)
Because ei is unrelated to the yield, an alternative interpretation of ei would be servicing
costs. I calculate servicing costs and marginal costs in more details in Section 1.5.2. An
equivalent way to state the zero-mean assumption of ei is to write:
mci = E[mci | yi, Xi, j] (1.5)
A lender j chooses an absolute markup mj in order to maximize expected profit. Lender
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j’s monthly profit on a loan i can be written as:
vij(mj) = pij −mci = mj (1.6)
Expected profit for lender j is obtained by summing vij over the total number of loans that







= M ×msj ×mj (1.7)
Assuming the lender chooses mj to maximize profit yields the standard first-order condition:
∂msj
∂mj
×mj +msj = 0 (1.8)
Search Cost Cut-offs
In the model all borrowers will eventually decide to transact with a lender; there is no outside
option of not getting a mortgage. The equilibrium search strategy for a borrower takes the
form of an optimal stopping rule (Weitzman, 1979). I describe this optimal stopping rule
and its implications on cut-off points in the search cost distribution below.
Since lenders are vertically differentiated, it is possible to rank them in the order of
increasing indirect utility. Let j = {1, . . . , N} be the index in this ranking, where N is the
number of lenders in the market. In the estimation, all lenders have non-zero market share,
and this order corresponds to that of increasing market shares. Let ρ denote the constant
sampling probability. A borrower will optimally stop searching as soon as her search cost si
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ρ(uik − uij) (1.9)
where ρ = 1/N is the sampling probability that is constant across lenders, and uij is the
highest indirect utility sampled up to that point. The additive assumption on ei and mci in
equation (1.2) implies that they both drop out of the expected marginal benefit of searching
(the right-hand side of equation (1.9)). Since both of the borrower-specific terms are canceled
out, the expected marginal benefit of searching does not vary across borrowers. Any two
borrowers, having the same level of uij as their highest utility sampled, would face the same
expected marginal benefit of search. This result is convenient and allows us to define search




ρ(uk − uj) (1.10)
where uk − uj is the difference in indirect utility between lender k and j, and this difference
is constant across all borrowers.
Search cost cut-offs cj are lender-specific and represent the lowest search cost for which
a transaction with lender j is viable. These cut-offs allows us to conveniently summarize
a borrower i’s optimal strategy. Upon sampling lender j, if borrower i’s search cost si
satisfies that si < cj, it is optimal for her to bypass j and resume searching for a better deal.
Otherwise, if si > cj, it is optimal to transact with lender j.
Because lenders are indexed in ascending order of utilities, the associated search cost
cut-off vector {c1, c2, . . . , cN} is a decreasing sequence; the highest utility lender would have
the lowest cut-off. Equation (1.10) implies that the cut-off for the highest utility lender is
zero (cN = 0), an implication of having no outside option. It is possible to introduce an
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outside option, but its market share would have to be specified.
1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Estimation of the Search Cost Distribution
Estimation of the search cost distribution follows closely the steps outlined by Hortaçsu and
Syverson (2004). The exposition here is brief; detailed derivations of equations in this section
can be found in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) and Carlson and McAfee (1983).
Denote the CDF of the search cost distribution by G(·) and the PDF by g(·). The
objective is to identify the two sequences of {G(c1), G(c2), . . . , G(cN)} and {c1, c2, . . . , cN},
and then extrapolate to approximate the entire search cost distribution. The procedure
consists of three steps: first, calculate {G(cj); j = 1, . . . , N} from observed market shares;
second, compute the sequence {g(cj)} using lenders’ first-order condition and estimated
markups, and finally, recover the cut-off sequence {cj} from the estimated CDF and PDF
using the trapezoid approximation.
A lender j’s market share consists of borrowers with search costs higher than cj, who
sample lender j before any other, more attractive lenders are found. At each search instance,
the probability that any particular lender is sampled is ρ. Let S denote the size of the market
(total number of loans), market shares msj for all lenders from 1 to N − 1 are determined
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by the CDF G(cj) via the following system of equations:
ms1 = S × ρ[1−G(c1)]








. . . (1.11)
















The first equation relates the market share of lender 1 (the lowest utility lender) with the
cut-off CDF G(c1). Market shares for all other lenders, up to N − 1, are represented by the
following equations in the system. In total, the system has N − 1 linear equations, which
are used to solve for N − 1 unknowns G(c1), G(c2), . . . , G(cN−1).
The cut-off PDF {g(cj)} can be obtained by first calculating the derivatives of market













(1− kρ+ ρ)(1− kρ)




Substituting this expression for ∂msj/∂mj into the lenders’ first-order condition (equa-
tion 1.8) again yields a system of N − 1 linear equations in N − 1 unknowns that allows
solving for g(c1), . . . , g(cN−1) as a function of estimated markups.
As in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), the systems of equations above have one less equa-
tion than the number of lenders in the market. Because we assume all borrowers obtain a
mortgage, the market share of lender N , whose quality is the highest in the market, can be
obtained simply by subtracting all other lenders’ market shares from the total. The markup
of lender N is not used to obtain the cut-off vector; lender N ’s cut-off has to be zero for all
borrowers to obtain a mortgage. The lack of the N th equation in the systems of equations
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above does not affect estimation of the search cost distribution; however, it implies that
counterfactual results, as explained in Section 1.7, are approximations.
Finally, once G(cj) and g(cj) have been calculated, search cost cut-offs cj are obtained
using the trapezoid approximation:




Starting with cN = 0, all search cost cut-offs can be solved recursively with the above
equation. All search cost cut-offs and their associated CDF values are now identified.
1.5.2 Estimation of Markups
Estimating the above model requires data on market shares and lender markups. Market
shares are used to compute the search cost CDF at the cut-off levels, while markups are
needed to compute the cut-off levels. I compute market shares directly from the Ginnie Mae
loan-level data. On the other hand, lender markups are not directly observed and need to be
estimated. To do so, I first find a reasonable approximation of the marginal cost of lending,
and then use equation 1.2 and the distributional assumption E[ei] = 0 to recover markups.
I approximate the expected value of the marginal cost of lending by breaking it into
two components: servicing cost SC, and payments R payable to investors who bought the
mortgage-backed security:
mci = E[mci | yi] = SC +Ri (1.14)
I compute payments Ri using the amortization formula and the yield rate r
y
i of the mortgage-
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backed security to which mortgage i belongs:
R̂yi = Li ×
ryi
1− (1 + ryi )−360
(1.15)
An alternative to estimating R is to use the coupon rate instead of the yield rate of the
mortgage-backed security in the above formula. When the coupon rate is used, this formula
calculates the monthly payments, payable to holders of the MBS, such that the loan principal
and interest will be repaid in 360 months. A drawback to using the coupon rate, as opposed
to the yield rate, is that the coupon rate does not capture variations in the transacted price
of the MBS. When a lender sells a MBS to investors, the price could be different to the face
value of the MBS. For example, if the price is higher than the face value, the lender would
receive an upfront premium; if the price is lower, the lender would be providing an upfront
discount. The yield rate adjusts for such variations in transacted price and represents the
true monthly cost of the MBS. It would be equivalent to the coupon rate if the mortgage-
backed security was bought at par (neither at a premium nor a discount). In computing R̂yi ,
I therefore use the yield rate ryi .
I assume a constant servicing cost SC for all loans. In general, servicing cost differs
depending on whether the loan is performing or non-performing (its delinquency status).
However, since lenders do not observe the delinquency status of loans at the time of origi-
nation, I use a weighted-average of servicing cost between performing and non-performing
loans. According to a report by the Urban Institute, annual servicing cost in 2014 amounts
to $158 for a performing loan and $1,949 for a non-performing loan (Goodman, 2016). Dur-
ing the sampled period, the delinquency rate of residential mortgage loans in the US is about
7.2% according to data published by the Federal Reserve Board.2 Using this information,
I calculate servicing cost to be $287 per year per loan. In the estimation, servicing cost is
measured on a monthly basis, I therefore set S = $24 per month per loan.
2Federal Reserve Board (2016), “Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial
Banks”.
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In table 1.5, I show the summary statistics of payments payable to investors, calculated
using both coupon and yield rates, the marginal cost, and estimated markups for five lenders
with the highest market shares in Texas. Empirically payments Rc (calculated with the
coupon rate) are invariably higher than Ry (calculated with the yield rate). The discrepancy
between them can be explained because during the sample period most mortgage-backed
securities are traded at a premium, hence the yield is almost always lower than the coupon
rate.
Table 1.5: Payments to Investors, Marginal Cost and Markup: Top 5 Lenders in Texas








Wells Fargo 793.90 675.84 699.84 131.11
(336.11) (294.61) (294.62) (0.42)
PennyMac 833.09 713.48 737.48 134.86
(310.13) (273.95) (273.95) (0.66)
US Bank 683.60 549.36 573.36 144.44
(238.07) (222.49) (222.49) (0.77)
USAA Federal Bank 963.32 856.74 880.74 122.50
(397.18) (351.22) (351.22) (1.04)
JP Morgan Chase 793.41 680.08 704.08 132.01
(364.87) (327.36) (327.36) (1.10)
Payment Rc and Ry refer to payments payable to investors, calculated using (respectively) the coupon
and the yield rate of the MBS. Marginal cost is the sum of Ry and servicing cost S. Standard deviations
are reported in parentheses for Rc, Ry, and Marginal Cost. For Markup, the standard error of the mean
is reported. All variables are measured in dollars.
Once E[mci] is obtained, I estimate lender markups using equation (1.2) and the as-
sumption that E[ei] = 0. The estimated markups are then simply the average of differences
between monthly payments and marginal costs, calculated for each lender. The last column
in table 1.5 shows the estimated markups for the sampled five lenders as well as the standard
errors.
Estimated markups are dispersed and vary across lenders. Table 1.6 shows the dispersion
in markups, as captured by the coefficient of variation (the ratio of standard deviation over
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New York 23 29928 176.33 72.52 0.41
North Dakota 18 2624 143.21 56.80 0.40
South Dakota 15 4081 93.89 33.39 0.36
Washington D.C. 17 1058 334.59 117.97 0.35
Iowa 20 8586 90.26 24.10 0.27
New Jersey 22 18788 192.57 25.16 0.13
Delaware 19 3850 161.04 20.61 0.13
New Hampshire 24 5063 152.21 16.21 0.11
Colorado 21 29239 170.77 16.35 0.10
California 25 97154 250.93 23.03 0.09
National Mean 20.82 21,409.75 138.16 28.19 0.21
mean), for ten markets with the highest and lowest degree of variation. The coefficient of
variation for markups ranges from a low of 0.09 in California to 0.41 in New York. Across
all markets, the mean of this coefficient of variation is about 0.21. This level of dispersion
is comparable to that found in other studies of price dispersion. For example, Sorensen
(2000), using a sample data on prices of prescription drug in New York, finds the coefficient
of variation to be 0.22. In another study by Villas-Boas (1995) on the market for coffee,
the coefficient of variation is 0.21. The authors in both of these studies argue that costly
consumer search represents a major explanatory factor of price dispersion.
The estimated markups also lends support for quality differentiation among lenders. In
Figure 1.1, I graph the log of estimated markups against the log of market shares for the
following markets: Connecticut, Maryland, Georgia (three states with the most number of
lenders), and Alaska, Utah, and Vermont (three with the least number of lenders). If lenders
are homogeneous and the degree of differentiation is negligible, the relationship between
markups and market shares should be negative and monotonic; a lender whose price is
consistently high should get a lower share and vice versa. However, as graphs in Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1: Scatter Plot of Log Markups against Log Market Shares
show, markups and market shares do not seem to be negatively correlated, suggesting that
quality differentiation is a relevant feature of this market.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Search Cost Distribution
I treat each state as an independent market, and estimate the model separately for all 50
states and the District of Columbia. In each market, the CDF G(·) and PDF g(·) of the
search cost distribution are identified at the cut-off points cj. The identification comes from
the market share equations (1.11) and lenders’ first-order equation (1.8). Having computed
G(cj) and g(cj), I obtain the cut-off levels cj from the trapezoid equation (1.13).
Using least-squares approximation, I fit a log-normal CDF over the estimated cut-offs
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cj and CDF G(cj). The fitting of a log-normal CDF is necessary because the search cost
distribution is non-parametrically identified only at the cut-off levels, in other words, only at
N number of points in its support. The continuity of a log-normal CDF allows for convenient
summary statistics across markets and implementation of counterfactuals where the cut-off
levels change. I find that the fit is relatively close across all markets.
Figure 1.2: Estimated search cost distribution for five states with the most observations
I report the estimation results of search cost distributions in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3.
For five largest markets (Texas, California, Florida, Georgia, and Ohio), I show the non-
parametrically identified points in the search cost distribution, as well as the fitted log-
normal curve. In each plot, from left to right the cut-off points (shown in circles) correspond
to lenders in decreasing utility order. The leftmost cut-off is always at the origin because the
highest utility lender have a zero search cost cut-off (cN = 0), an implication of assuming
no outside option. cN = 0 also follows directly from the cut-off equation (1.10). In a similar
vein, the CDF value at the rightmost cut-off G(c1) is always less than 1. This result arises
because all lenders in the data, including lender 1 who provides the lowest utility, have
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positive market shares. Should G(c1) = 1, there would be no borrower whose search cost is
higher than c1. Consequently every borrower who samples lender 1 would choose to search
further, and lender 1 would have a zero market share.
Figure 1.3: Estimated interquartile range of search cost across all states
In Table 1.7, I report summary statistics on the distribution of consumer search cost
across all 51 markets. Table 1.7 shows the average at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
percentiles of search cost distributions across all 51 markets. The median per-month search
cost, averaged across all markets, is around $42. Compared to the Canadian market, where
Allen et al. (2014a) estimate a per-month search cost of about $20, borrowers in U.S. mort-
gage markets seem to have higher search costs. According to Table 1.7, a borrower with
a $20 search cost would correspond approximately to the 30th percentile in the search cost
distribution. The higher search cost levels in the U.S. reflect institutional differences of this
market between the two countries.
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Table 1.7: Average of Estimated Search Cost across All States
Percentiles Minimum Maximum Median
10 1.74 28.00 5.34
25 5.25 58.76 13.82
50 17.88 133.92 42.24
75 60.88 312.95 129.19
90 170.33 972.32 325.26
I use the empirical bootstrap method to obtain standard errors and confidence intervals
around the estimated search cost CDF. Unlike Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), empirical
bootstrap is feasible here because lenders’ markups, an input into the model, are estimated
and not directly observed. I find that the 95% confidence interval of the search cost CDF
is very tight in most markets. The appendix provides a more detailed discussion on the
application of the empirical bootstrap method in this setting.
1.6.2 The Relationship between Search Cost Distribution andMar-
ket Demographics
Estimating the distribution of search costs in separate geographical markets allows us to
study the connection between search cost distributions and market-level demographics. Ac-
cording to Goldman and Johansson (1978) and Nishida and Remer (2015), search costs may
arise from two factors: (1) the opportunity cost of time and money (phone calls, driving to
banks, paperwork etc.), and (2) the cognitive and information-processing capacity of con-
sumers. The former factor presumably varies with household income, while the latter varies
with age and education level. As explained in section 1.3.4, I employ data on household
income, age and years of education in 2014 from the American Community Survey in order
to examine their relationship with search cost distribution. Table 1.3 shows the summary
statistics for these demographic variables at the state-level.
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To incorporate demographic variables into the estimation, I specify the parameters of the
fitted log-normal distributions as:
µ = β0 +X
µβ
σ = γ0 +X
σγ
Here, µ and σ refers to the mean and standard deviation of the associated normal distri-
bution. Xµ is a vector of observables containing the average household income, median
age, and average years of education in each state. Xσ contains the standard deviation of
these demographic variables. Constant terms β0 and γ0 are included in both equations.
The parametrization of the mean parameter µ and standard deviation parameter σ using,
respectively, mean and standard variables follows closely that used by Nishida and Remer
(2015).













Constant 9.533 0.657 13,813 13,813
Household Income 0.026 0.001 1.02 1.02
Age 0.039 0.004 1.04 1.04
Years of Education -0.707 0.057 0.49 0.49
Std. Dev. Parameter σ
Constant 7.816 2.161 - 42.89
Household Income 0.023 0.005 - 1.03
Age -0.202 0.075 - 0.74
Years of Education -1.291 0.356 - 0.29
The effects on median and average search costs are multiplicative. For example, a $1000 increase in household
income would raise the median and mean search cost by a factor of 1.02, or 2%.
I then use non-linear least squares to fit this parametrized log-normal distribution to the
search cost cut-offs obtained in section 1.5.1. Coefficient estimates for β and γ and their
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associated standard errors are reported in Table 1.8. All estimates are statistically significant.
I find that household income and age are positively related to the mean parameter, or
equivalently markets with higher incomes and older populations tend to have a higher search
cost. On the other hand, years of education and search cost level are negatively related, which
confirms the intuition that educated consumers are more sophisticated and therefore have a
lower cost of search.
The variance of the search cost distribution is also related to the variance of demographic
variables. Markets with high variation in income are associated with a high variation in
search costs, which is consistent with the hypothesis that income level captures the opportu-
nity cost of searching. In contrast, an increase in the variance of age and years of education
reduces the variance of search costs, an empirical result also documented in gasoline markets
by Nishida and Remer.
We can examine the economic significance of changes in income, age, and education on
search cost levels. Because of our parametrization, the coefficients in Table 1.8 represent
the effects of changes in the independent variables on the parameters µ and σ. It is possible
to convert these coefficients into more economically meaningful numbers. For example, the
third and fourth columns in Table 1.8 show the effects on the median and average search
cost levels. Since the median and mean of a lognormal distribution are respectively eµ and
eµ+σ
2/2, the effects of changes in µ and σ on the median and mean are multiplicative.3 A








If X affects only the standard deviation parameter σ, then a change in X would affect the average search





$1000 increase in household income would raise the median and mean search cost by a factor
of 1.02, or 2%. Likewise, a one year increase in age raise the median and mean search cost by
4%; a one year increase in the average level of education, however, cuts the median and mean
search cost by over 50%. Changes in the standard deviation parameter σ only affects average
search cost. Standard deviations of income positively affects the average search cost, while
standard deviations of age and education negatively affects average search cost. Taken as a
whole, these findings suggest a close link between market demographics and the distribution
of search costs.
1.7 Counterfactual of Search Cost Reductions
1.7.1 General Setup
I consider counterfactual scenarios where search costs are reduced by 10, 25, 50, 75, 90
and 100 percents. These scenarios provide a characterization of how search costs affect
equilibrium price and quantity in the market. Moreover, by quantifying how welfare changes
in each scenario, we also would be able to determine the importance of costly search in this
industry, and what can be gained from efforts to reduce search costs.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau recently enacted several policies to improve
price transparency in the mortgage market. These efforts include initiatives to educate
consumers on the benefits on mortgage shopping, regulations to streamline to price quoting
process as well as new tools to facilitate price comparisons. We could reasonably presume
that many of these initiatives serve to reduce shopping cost, although the exact extent of
such reduction is difficult to quantify. A counterfactual with discrete reductions in search
costs would be useful as an approximate roadmap.
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In each counterfactual scenario, I derive the new price equilibrium that arises from dis-
crete changes in search costs. The actual equilibrium provides the benchmark search cost
distribution, from which I derive counterfactual distributions where all search cost levels are
reduced by a specified percentage. In solving for the new equilibrium, I keep several model
primitives constant. Quality of lenders is invariant, and lenders simply take the quality vec-
tor δ as given. I also do not consider entry and exit explicitly, and the number of lenders does
not change across scenario. An exception to this rule occurs when a lender optimally charges
zero markup, earns zero profit, and has zero market share, then I do not take its markup
into account when calculating the average market-level markup (practically this lender has
dropped out of the market).
The equilibrium where search costs are reduced by 100 percent can be solved analytically.
Without positive search costs, the model becomes that of price competition with full infor-
mation and quality differences. Price competition then ensures that only the highest quality
lender is able to charge a positive absolute markup. In each market, lender N who provides
the highest utility would charge a markup mN = δN − δN−1 (the difference between the
highest quality and the next best one), while all other lenders j 6= N would charge mj = 0.
Because it is now possible for all borrowers to locate the highest quality lender N costlessly,
this lender would capture 100% of market share.
For the remaining scenarios where search costs are reduced by a positive factor less than
100 percent, I use numerical methods to approximate the new price equilibrium. Given the
search cost distribution and the vector of lender quality, I find the vector of markups that
satisfy the systems of equations in (1.11) and (1.12). One drawback of this approach is that
there are only N − 1 equations in each of these systems. For the market shares equations
in (1.11), having N −1 equations is enough to identify the market share of all N firms, since
the last firm’s market share must be so that all market shares add up to 1. However, for the
equations on the first-order conditions of markups in (1.12), having only N − 1 equations
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implies that one cannot solve for the profit-maximizing markup of the N th firm, which in
this case is the highest quality lender.
For lender N , we know its profit-maximizing markup at the two extremes of search cost
reductions: when search costs are reduced by 0 or by 100 percents. In the intermediating
scenarios, I assume that lender N ’s markup is not affected by search cost reductions and is




where r = 10, 25, 50, 75, 90 denotes the percentage point reductions in search costs, and
mr=0N is lender N’s markup in the original equilibrium. For this reason, apart from the two
extremes of 0 or 100 percent reductions, all intermediating scenarios can only be viewed as
an approximation of the profit-maximizing equilibrium. In Appendix A.4.1, I consider an
alternative specification of lender N’s markup where it varies proportionally to the magnitude
of search cost reductions.
1.7.2 Price Effects
I first examine the effects of search cost reductions on optimal markups that lenders charge.
Characterizing these price effects is useful because from a theoretical perspective, the rela-
tionship between search cost, price level, and price dispersion is not always clear and varies
across models and assumptions (Baye et al., 2006).
Regarding average price observed in a market, on the one hand, lower search costs implies
more price competition between firms, pulling average price down. On the other hand,
when search costs are uniformly reduced by a certain percentage, as in this counterfactual,
the variance of search costs is also reduced, pushing average price up. Intuitively, when
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consumers have lower but more homogeneous search costs, the gain from capturing the low-
search cost consumers becomes relatively smaller, and firms have less incentive to set a low
price. When search cost becomes completely homogeneous, the Diamond (1971) paradox
may arise, in which all firms set the monopoly price.
Likewise, the effect of reduced search cost on price dispersion may also be unclear. Mod-
els such as Carlson and McAfee (1983) predict that lowering search costs also lowers the
variance of prices. In contrast, others such as Stahl (1989) imply a non-monotonic relation-
ship between search cost and price dispersion: as search costs are reduced, price dispersion
first increases then decreases. Empirical analysis tend to be mixed, with evidence supporting
both theoretical views (Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Ancarani
and Shankar, 2004).
I employ average absolute markup as the metric to measure price level and the coefficient
of variation (CV) as that of price dispersion. Different geographical markets have different
model primitives; namely the benchmark search cost distribution, the number of lenders, as
well as the distribution of lender quality all vary across markets. Because of this, there is
also variation across markets in lenders’ choice of optimal markups when search costs are re-
duced. However, a general trend of how prices change over all markets can be an informative
summary and an indication of how markets would respond to search cost reductions.
In Figure 1.4, I show the frequency count of how average markup would change in each
state. There are six panels in this figure, each corresponding to a separate scenario and a
separate level of search cost decrease ranging from 10% to 100%. In all cases, the average
markup observed in the actual equilibrium is the benchmark, corresponding to a 0% change
in the horizontal axis. Histogram bars to the left of zero shows the count of states where
average markup has fallen compared to the actual equilibrium.
We observe that the distribution of average markup change tends to shift to the right as
38
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Change in Average Markup following Search Cost Reductions
the level of search cost reduction is increased. More and more states would experience an
increase in average price, and the magnitude of increase is also significant, reaching 200%
over the original average markup in some cases. However, there is a price decrease in the
zero search cost case, since full information implies that only the highest quality lender is
charging a positive markup, while all other lenders are charging a zero markup. It appears
that price level will tend to rise as search costs are reduced. The incentive to set a low price
and capture a larger share of consumers with low search costs disappears as more consumers
become informed and consumer search costs are more homogeneous. In Appendix A.4.2, I
examine the change in average markups when search costs are reduced, but the variance of
search costs is unchanged, and find that under that scenario, lenders are more likely to set
lower prices than in the original equilibrium.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of Change in Markup Dispersion following Search Cost Reductions
As for price dispersion, in Figure 1.5, I graph the frequency count of the coefficient of
variation of optimal markups charged by lenders in each state. Values on the horizontal
axis represents the percentage change in the coefficient of variation compared to the original
equilibrium. We observe a non-monotonic relationship between dispersion and search cost
reductions. As the magnitude of search cost reduction increases, the coefficient of variation
seems to increase, and optimal markups charged become more dispersed at first. The increase
is even more significant in the extreme case of 100% reduction, because there would be only
one lender with a positive markup while all others charge a zero markup, usually leading to




The model predicts two sources of welfare change following an elimination of search costs.
First, there is a gain in the quality of transacted lenders, because borrowers can now more
easily find lenders with higher quality. Second, consumer welfare also increases from the
saving of direct search cost expenditures, because each search instance would cost less. Here
I describe how each of these effects is characterized and discuss the welfare results of the
counterfactual.
Total Quality
When search costs are reduced, higher quality lenders are more likely to be found by bor-
rowers, and would gain a larger market share. From the market-level perspective, there is
an increase in the total quality of lenders, when that quality is weighted by market share. I





where j = N denotes the highest quality lender, and msj and δj are the market shares and
quality of lender j, respectively. We would expect TQ to increase monotonically as search
costs are reduced by an increasing percentage. At the extreme, in the equilibrium with no
search costs, only lender N has a positive market share, and total transacted quality would




To calculate the amount of search cost expenditures, I rely on structural assumptions in
the consumer search problem. The optimal search strategy described in Section 1.4.2 allows
us to calculate the expected search cost expenditure for any borrower given her search cost
level. For a given market size, it is possible to approximate total expenditures at the market
level by first calculating it for each individual borrower.
For a borrower with a search cost level si, the number of search instances to find a suc-
cessful match follows a geometric distribution. The probability that the kth search instance
is the first success after k − 1 failures is:
Pr(Xi = k) = (1− λi)k−1λi
where λi denotes the probability of a successful search during each search instances. The
mean of this geometric distribution, E[X], represents the expected number of search in-
stances up to and including the first successful match. E[X] is given by 1/λi; therefore, the
borrower’s total search expenditure, inclusive of the final and successful search, is si/λi.
To calculate total expenditure for each state-level market, I take M random draws from
the borrower’s search cost distribution, whereM varies across markets and equals the average
number of new loans each month over the period October 2013 to March 2015. I calculate the
expected search expenditure for each of these randomly drawn borrowers, and then aggregate
borrower-level expenditures to approximate the market-level expenditure.
Let SE denote search cost expenditures. A measure for social welfare would then be
total quality less search expenditure:
SW = TQ− SE (1.16)
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Profit
Typically, changes in marginal costs and in market equilibrium quantity and price would
also affect social welfare. However, in this setting, these sources of changes are not present.
Marginal cost of lending depends on borrower characteristics, and remains the same when
search costs are reduced. Market quantity also does not vary, because the model assumes
that all borrowers would obtain a mortgage. Absent the change in equilibrium quantity,
any changes in equilibrium price would amount to a transfer of surplus between lenders and
borrowers.
Because there is no fixed cost, the size of the surplus transfer between lenders and bor-
rowers can be determined by calculating the change in profit of lenders. Under the current
assumptions, calculating profit is straightforward because the absolute markupmj represents
the lender j’s profit for each loan that it originates. Once optimal markups mj and market
shares msj are determined for each counterfactual scenario, profit would simply be:
Πj = M ×mj ×msj
where M is the market size.
Results
There are two remarks worth discussing before results on welfare calculations are presented.
First, for all the welfare quantities listed above, including profit, total quality, and search
expenditures, it is possible to measure them either at the loan-level and at a more aggregate
(state or national) level. A loan-level basis is useful in separating the effect of market
size from the welfare calculations, especially since the model assumes there is no change
in equilibrium quantity. In contrast, a market or national level basis provides information
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on the aggregate effects of search cost reductions, which due to the considerable size of the
government-backed mortgage market, can be very significant. Appendix A.2 explains how
welfare is calculated at the loan and the national level.
Second, all welfare numbers are measured on a monthly dollar basis. This measurement
unit follows directly from observing mortgage prices and markups in monthly and annual
terms instead of in absolute terms. For instance, a loan-level welfare gain of 500 dollars
per month means that market participants are each better off by 500 dollars each month
for the remaining life of their mortgage contract. Because the expected length of mortgages
in the United States is about 84 months, one way to convert measurements to an absolute
basis by converting the sum of all monthly dollars in 84 months to a net present value. This
approach, even with a positive discount factor, tends to suggest that welfare changes can be
very large on an absolute basis. However, the expected length of each mortgage contract,
observed privately by market participants, may differ from 84 months.
In Figure 1.6, I show how total quality, search expenditure, profit, and social welfare
changes as search costs are reduced discreetly from 0 to 100 percents. Here welfare is mea-
sured on the vertical axis and on a loan-level basis. For example, when search costs are cut
by 10%, a value of total quality of about 470 dollars means that total transacted quality, as
described in the previous section, divided by the number of loans is equivalent to about 470
dollars per month. It is apparent that all the welfare quantities move monotonically and as
expected. Total quality increases; search expenditure decreases, and social welfare increases
as a result.
Table 1.9 presents the welfare numbers that are used to construct Figure 1.6. I find that
welfare gained from reductions in search cost can be considerable, even at a loan-level basis.
When search costs are cut by only 10%, social welfare would increase more than two-fold
(from 94 dollars per month to 224 dollars per month). This increase is a result from an
increase in total quality and a decrease in search expenditure (both having the magnitude
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Figure 1.6: Welfare Effects (in dollars) at the Loan Level
of about 60 dollars per month). These calculations suggest that market allocations can be
significantly improved even if search costs are reduced by a relatively small percentage.
Change in profit is approximately 10 dollars per month at the 10% reduction level.
This change in profit amounts to a transfer from consumers to lenders that follows from
an increase in markup when marginal cost is held constant. Although producer surplus
increases, consumer surplus does not necessarily have to decrease, thanks to the gain from
total quality and the saving in search cost expenditure. The positive change in profit and
social welfare imply that both buyers and sellers benefit from search cost reduction.
At the extreme, when search costs are reduced by 100%, search expenditures are zero, and
social welfare would increase from 94 dollars per month to nearly 700 dollars per month. If
search costs are completely eliminated, an average borrower of government-backed mortgage
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Table 1.9: Welfare Effects (in dollars) at the Loan Level
Search Cost Reduction 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
Profit 139 151 147 138 134 138 299
Total Quality 408 472 496 549 639 730 698
Search Expenditure 314 248 228 190 155 116 -
Social Welfare 94 224 267 358 484 613 698
See Appendix A.2 for how welfare quantities are calculated at the loan level.
would experience a utility increase that is equivalent to receiving an additional 600 dollars
each month for the rest of his mortgage’s life. This result highlights the relevance of costly
search in the government-backed mortgage market because put another way, the presence of
costly search has reduced his utility by the same amount.
Table 1.10: Total Welfare Effects (in million dollars) at the National Level
Search Cost Reduction 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
Profit 8.46 6.61 6.41 6.04 5.85 6.03 18.11
Total Quality 24.74 20.60 21.64 23.98 27.89 31.87 42.33
Search Expenditure 19.05 10.82 9.97 8.32 6.76 5.08 -
Social Welfare 5.69 9.78 11.67 15.66 21.13 26.78 42.33
Market size in each state is the average number of new loans each month from September
2013 to December 2015. See Appendix A.2 for how welfare quantities are calculated at
the national level.
While welfare effects at the loan-level are helpful in separating out the effects of market
size, from a policy-making perspective, it is arguably more helpful to measure welfare changes
at the aggregate level. In Table 1.10, I show the equivalent welfare results measured at the
aggregate nationwide level. In calculating these numbers, I take the market size in each
state as the average number of new loans each month during the period from September
2013 to March 2015. The welfare numbers in Table 1.10 can then be interpreted as flow
welfare variables across the U.S. government-backed mortgage market, measured in terms of
monthly dollars.
I find that search cost reductions can have a significant effect on the flow of welfare. A
small 10% reduction in search costs can increase the welfare flow each month from about
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5.7 to 9.7 million dollars per month. Furthermore, a complete elimination of search costs
increases welfare flow by over 35 million dollars per month. Considering that mortgages in
the U.S. have an average life of 84 months, an absolute measure of this welfare change can
be even more significant. These calculation results provide a clear theoretical foundation for
the benefit of reducing consumer search costs in this industry.
1.8 Conclusion
Costly consumer search is relevant in mortgage markets because borrowers often have to
go through a prolonged process in order to gather accurate price quotes. The literature,
however, does not readily provide information on how large consumer search costs might
be, and how much welfare is lost due to the presence of search. Quantifications of search
costs and welfare effects are especially important considering the size and scope of mortgage
markets in the United States.
In this chapter, I provide one of the first estimates of consumer search costs in this market.
The estimated search costs are large: a median borrower stops searching when the expected
utility gain from the next search is less than $40 per month. Due to costly consumer search,
market welfare is reduced by about $600 per borrower per month. The reduction in welfare
occurs because under costly search borrowers spend resources on searching and are matched
with lower quality lenders. Given the number of new borrowers in the government-backed
mortgage market each month, this welfare reduction corresponds to about $35 million at the
national level.
I establish the relationship between market demographics and search cost magnitudes
in order to examine the nature of search costs. Results indicate that search costs in this
market are related to both the opportunity cost of time and money, as well as an individual
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borrower’s education level. Therefore, policies directed at improving general and financial
educations, such as educating consumers on the functioning of mortgage markets, could
potentially be fruitful.
I solve a range of counterfactual scenarios to characterize the effects of search cost re-
ductions on social welfare, price dispersion, and price level. I find that following search cost
reductions, average prices would increase, but consumers benefit from spending less on search
and from finding a better match. As a result, social welfare would increase unambiguously.




Price Discrimination in U.S.
Mortgage Markets
2.1 Introduction
The market for mortgages in the United States provides lenders with many favorable con-
ditions in order to practice price discrimination. First, interest rates are quoted specifically
for each borrower and loan contract. The customer-specific nature of price quoting sets the
mortgage market apart from many other consumer products where firms have posted prices
common to all customers. By quoting a separate price to each borrower and loan, mortgage
lenders can potentially extract surplus on a loan-level basis. Second, mortgages contracts are
by nature an exclusive good and cannot be resold by the customer. A price discrimination
scheme can therefore be supported because a borrower who receives a low rate would not be
able to resell his or her contract to someone who would have received a high rate.
Should lenders practice price discrimination, the ramifications on the mortgage market
can be considerable. Market surplus may be redistributed from borrowers to lenders as
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well as across borrower groups. Given the size of the mortgage market in the US, which
measures at 13 trillion dollars in total mortgage debt in 2014, the magnitude of this welfare
redistribution would be very significant. The presence of price discrimination is also a sign
that the mortgage credit market is less than competitive. Hence, the redistributive effect of
discrimination may be compounded by a further decrease in total market welfare. Besides,
price discrimination can also affect borrowing decisions. Instead of being determined solely by
the cost of lending and borrowers’ default risk, interest rates under price discrimination would
also reflect many other factors concerning the elasticity of demand, such as the borrowers’
search cost, negotiation skill, and outside option. At the macro-level, price discrimination
can have macroeconomic consequences, as borrowers who get charged a high price unrelated
to cost factors would then have an increased risk of default (Gerardi, Goette and Meier,
2010).
Price discrimination is even more likely considering the high level of search cost that
borrowers face in this market. Variations in search costs provides a basis to charge different
markups to different borrowers. A high search cost reduces the borrower’s willingness to
engage in shopping and makes her more likely to accept a higher price. It also affects the
number of sampled lenders and the outside option, which provides important bargaining
leverage during interest rate negotiations. Provided that lenders have the means to directly
or indirectly observe search costs, price discrimination could then be supported: in order to
maximize profit, lenders may charge a higher markup to borrowers with a higher search cost.
Even though the institutional setup of the mortgage market is well-suited to price dis-
crimination, it does not necessarily imply that mortgage lenders are adopting this practice.
Despite the customer-specific price quoting process, price discrimination may not happen
if the market is competitive enough. With little market power, lenders would be forced to
charge very close to the marginal cost of lending. An open question is therefore to determine
whether price discrimination does in fact exist in the United States mortgage markets.
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This chapter analyzes data on recent mortgage loans in the United States and tests if
the data is consistent with the existence of price discrimination. Price discrimination is
formulated as being driven primarily by variations in search costs across borrowers. The
presence of varying search costs implies that in equilibrium borrowers would face different
prices from lenders even if marginal cost is held constant. Unlike many other discriminatory
practices, this type of discrimination is perfectly acceptable under the current legal and
regulatory framework.
In the context of U.S. mortgage markets, not much is known about price discrimination
driven by consumer search costs. The literature studying discrimination in consumer credit
markets has traditionally focused on illegal activities of discriminating against minority bor-
rowers or those who reside in low-income neighborhoods (Munnell, Tootell, Browne and
McEneaney, 1996; Goldberg, 1996). Lawful price discrimination that stems from differences
in consumer search cost, on the other hand, has received very little academic attention. An
exception is Allen et al. (2014c) who argue that positive search cost is consistent with the
pattern of price dispersion they observe in the Canadian mortgage market.
The paper bridges this gap in the literature and provides the first suggestive evidence on
the existence of lawful price discrimination in U.S. mortgage markets. I develop a stylized
mortgage search model with multiple customer types. Each customer type incurs a different
marginal cost of lending and has a different level of search cost. Within each type, there is
a fraction of shoppers with zero search cost, as well as non-shoppers with a positive search
cost. I solve for the equilibrium price distribution assuming firms are maximizing profit for
each customer type. Price discrimination is inherent in this model as lenders find it optimal
to vary markup across and within customer types, even if the marginal cost of lending is
held constant.
The model demonstrates testable restrictions on distribution of transacted interest rates.
The equilibrium features a constant pass-through rate; proportionally an increase in marginal
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cost corresponds to the same increase in equilibrium transacted rates. On the contrary, a
change in search cost has a differential effect that vary positively with the conditional quantile
of transacted rates; the effect of search cost is larger at the top quantiles of transacted rates
than at the bottom.
The contrasting effects on transacted interest rates between marginal cost and search cost
changes provide a basis to test the model. If a loan observable is affiliated with the marginal
cost of lending, its marginal effect on the interest rate is constant across all quantiles of
transacted rates. On the other hand, if it correlates with the borrower’s search cost level,
marginal effects would get larger in absolute values as we move up the quantiles of transacted
interest rates. A loan observable may also affiliates with both marginal cost and search cost,
in which case its marginal effect would vary monotonically across interest rate quantiles.
In order to examine the effects of loan observables on different quantiles of transacted
interest rates, I run quantile regressions using recent data on FHA mortgages. The data is
obtained from Ginnie Mae for the period from October 2013 to March 2015. FHA mortgages
are fully insured, ensuring that variations in default risks are not a relevant factor driving
observed price dispersion. The data contains loan-level observations with rich information of
loan observables, such as borrower’s credit score, the loan-to-value ratio, the loan amount,
among others.
The empirical analysis is implemented in two steps. First, in order to determine how each
loan observable correlates with marginal cost, I run an OLS regression of mortgage-backed
securities yield rate on loan observables. Because lenders borrow from the secondary mort-
gage market to fund their loan originations, the yield rate represents a good approximation
for the marginal cost of lending. Second, I run a quantile regression of transacted interest
rates on observed loan variables. Depending on whether the loan observable is determined
to be correlated with marginal cost or not, its marginal effects on transacted rates would
be either constant or vary monotonically across quantiles. Quantile regression provides a
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convenient way to examine this hypothesis.
Estimated results are to a large extent consistent with the theoretical model of price
discrimination. In a quantile regression of transacted interest rates on loan observables,
all marginal effects exhibit patterns predicted by the model. For loan observables that
correlate with marginal cost, including credit score, original principal balance, and loan-to-
value ratio among others, the marginal effects either vary monotonically across quantiles
or equal to a non-zero constant. For those that do not correlate with marginal cost, such
as the debt expense to income ratio and the number of borrowers, the marginal effects
decrease monotonically or approximately equal to zero at all quantiles. The results support
the existence of price discrimination created by costly consumer search in U.S. mortgage
markets.
The model combined with the estimation results also provide insight into how each loan
observables relate to the level of borrower search costs. Knowing this relationship may be
helpful as search costs are for the most part not directly observed. I find that credit score,
original principal balance, debt expense ratio, and first-time buyer status, have a negative
association with search costs, while an indicator of whether the borrower receives a down-
payment assistance and the number of living units in the property being mortgaged are
positively associated with search costs.
The presence of price discrimination also suggests that, for policy makers aiming to
promote more competition in the banking sector, not only the number of bank but also
the search cost of borrowers is relevant. While increasing the number of banks and lending
institutions may increase competition, it could also lead to excessive risk-taking and engender
systemic financial collapses. If the policy goal is to prevent unfair discrimination of mortgage
borrowers, efforts directed at reducing consumer search cost may actually be very useful.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. The theoretical model of mortgage
shopping presented in Section 2.5 contains elements similar to many other search-theoretic
models where consumers shopping for the best price have to incur a positive search cost
for each additional price quote. Some representative papers in this literature include Stigler
(1961), Rothschild (1973), Reinganum (1979), Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee
(1983), and Rob (1985), and Stahl (1989). A common implication in these models is that
price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome even when products are homogeneous
across sellers. Baye et al. (2006) provide a detailed literature review on many of these
search-theoretic models as well as others on consumer search and price dispersion.
Building on the theoretical models, another set of papers aim to develop methodologies to
estimate the magnitude of consumer search cost empirically. Hong and Shum (2006) propose
a method to recover the distribution of search costs using only data on observed prices. The
dispersion in prices, when combined with theoretical results on consumers’ optimal stopping
rule, reveal how much consumers could have gained from searching further, and provide an
estimate for search cost. Among others, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) and Wildenbeest
(2011) extend this framework to allow for variations in the quality of sellers. These papers
provide important insights on how to apply consumer search theory in empirical works.
Related specifically to price dispersion in credit markets, there is also an extensive lit-
erature studying the pricing of loan contracts. Many important works in this literature
focus on determining the relationship between default risk of debtors and the interest rate
they get charged. On the theoretical side, Geanakoplos (2002) and Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Shubik (2005) study the effects of default risks on loan terms in a general equilibrium
setting. Geanakoplos (2002) proposes a model where price of risky contracts is endogenously
determined, and shows that when the probability of default increases, contract price will
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decrease.
The practice of pricing contracts according to their default risk is commonly referred to
as risk-based pricing. Even though risk-based pricing has been identified as a relevant pricing
mechanism in credit markets as early as in Riley (1987), only starting in mid-1990s, advances
in underwriting models and data processing technology enabled credit lenders to adopt this
pricing practice. This adoption is also partially driven by the Community Reinvestment Act
which mandates lenders to place greater emphasis on lending to borrowers in lower-income
neighborhoods (Canner and Passmore, 1997).
Many empirical papers find evidence of increasing use of risk-based pricing in mortgage
markets as wells as in other consumer credit markets. Edelberg (2006) documents how such
practice results in an increase in the premium paid per unit of risk. Also as a result, low-
risk borrowers increase their debt level as a result of their falling borrowing cost. High-risk
borrowers gained access to expanded credit, but also face higher prices. Livshits, MacGee
and Tertilt (2011) test the prediction that financial innovations generate entry of lending
contracts targeted at high-risk borrowers, which in turn leads to higher default rates and
higher price dispersion. Using the Survey of Consumer Finance and data from the Board
of Governors, they find evidence consistent with this prediction. Einav, Jenkins and Levin
(2013) study the adoption of credit scoring at an auto finance firm and find that risk classifi-
cation help screen out high-risk borrowers and enable targeting more generous loans toward
low-risk borrowers.
The strong relationship between default risk and contract prices, identified by both the
theoretical and empirical literature, motivates the choice to focus on fully-insured loans in
the paper. Since all sampled loans in the empirical analysis are fully-insured, the observed
dispersion in interest rates is therefore more readily attributable to consumer search rather
than the variation in default risks. In a series of papers on negotiation and pricing in
the Canadian mortgage market, Allen et al. (2014c) and Allen et al. (2014a) also focus on
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insured loans as a means to eliminate the variation in contract prices driven by default risk
heterogeneity.
Finally, this chapter also contributes to the long-standing theoretical and empirical lit-
erature of price discrimination in consumer markets. As presented in Tirole (1988), the
foundational theory on price discrimination consider scenarios where firms are able to charge
customers their maximum willingness-to-pay (first-degree discrimination), offer a menu of
prices to which customers self-select (second-degree discrimination), or segment customers
and charge a different markup for each customer segment (third-degree discrimination). Re-
cent developments extend the theory to study more explicitly the acquisition of customer
information and use of different price and non-price instruments in implementing price dis-
crimination. A review of these recent models is provided in Armstrong (2006). Seen in the
light of this extensive theoretical literature, the model outlined in Section 2.5 is very sim-
ilar to the canonical third-degree price discrimination framework, where multiple customer
segments are each charged a different price.
Because price discrimination amounts to selling products with the same marginal cost
at different prices to different customers, the main challenge in testing empirically for price
discrimination is usually to separate out cost-driven price dispersion from markup-driven
price dispersion. An accepted approach in the literature, exemplified by Borenstein and
Rose (1994), is to first control for cost or competition, then measure how much price disper-
sion remains afterward. In more competitive markets, dispersion is more readily attributed
to variation in costs of serving customers, whereas in less competitive markets, it could be
caused by firms extracting rent from customers. Borenstein and Rose (1994) apply this rea-
soning to data on airline ticket prices and find evidence consistent with price discrimination.
Shepard (1991) provides an alternative test of whether price variations in the retail gasoline
market can be attributed to discrimination or cost, and finds that discrimination plays a
significant role in pricing. Busse and Rysman (2005) studies the effects of competition on
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second-degree price discrimination in the market of display advertising on Yellow Pages di-
rectories, and find that purchasers of large ads face a lower price than purchasers of small
ads in more competitive markets. In the context of employer-provided health insurance
markets, Dafny (2010) finds evidence that more profitable employers face higher premium
growths, and the growth is higher in more concentrated markets, suggesting the existence of
price discrimination. Mortimer (2007) studies optimal pricing decisions under indirect price
discrimination and finds that predictions of a price discrimination model are supported by
data in the VHS and DVD movie distribution market.
The empirical analysis used in this chapter builds on an alternative approach in contrast
to the method described above which hinges on using competition as a control for cost. I
derive testable empirical relationships between price and loan observables, and use quantile
regression to verify if results are consistent with the model. I find controls for cost empirically
by regressing cost proxies on a set of loan observables. This approach is very similar to that
proposed by Allen et al. (2014c) who study price discrimination in the Canadian mortgage
market.
2.3 Background on FHA Mortgages
The sample used in this chapter consists exclusively of mortgages insured by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA). The FHA was established by Congress in 1934 under the
National Housing Act, with the main goal of stimulating U.S. mortgage markets after the
Great Depression. The FHA program initialized many changes regarding contractual fea-
tures of mortgages that still persist until the present day. For example, under the FHA
program, for the first time borrowers could obtain long-term mortgages with amortization
period longer than 20 years. These long-term mortgages gradually became the norm in the
industry, replacing those with short terms. Changes introduced by the FHA program helped
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bring about stability and recovery in the mortgage market after the Great Depression, and
contributed to increasing homeownership rates in America.
A key innovation introduced by the FHA program was insurance protection on approved
mortgages. The insurance fully protects lenders and mortgage originators in the event of
credit default. If a borrower defaults on an FHA-insured loan, the lender would be reimbursed
for the remaining principal amount owed. Introduced in the wake of the Great Depression,
this insurance helped increase the supply of mortgage credit in the market without requiring
the FHA to originate the loans. To this day, the insurance scheme has grown significantly.
FHA now insures a range of mortgage types, including single-family, multi-family properties,
as well as hospital facilities. At the end of fiscal year 2012, 7.7 million single-family home
mortgages with a total outstanding balance of $1.1 trillion are insured by FHA.
FHA mortages are available to borrowers who can credibly demonstrate their ability to
repay loans according to the term of their contract. Although FHA borrowers are predomi-
nantly low-income families, there is no strict income limit for borrowers seeking FHA-insured
loans. Lenders originating FHA loans use a standard credit worksheet to examine the ap-
plicant’s financial status, funds to close the loans, and other debts and obligations. Most
applicants have to demonstrate that their monthly mortgage payments would make up less
than 31% of their monthly income, and that their total debt obligations would be less than
43% of gross monthly income. Effective October 4, 2010, the minimum credit score for FHA
approval is 500, and there is an increase in down-payment for borrowers with credit scores
below 580.
The principal amount of mortgages insured by FHA is subject to a statutory floor and
ceiling; these limits vary across areas and the number of living units in the collateral property.
For instance, in December 2013 - a time period observed in our sample, FHA approve loans in
the range of $271,050 to $729,750 in high-cost areas as defined by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). The down-payment on FHA mortgages is lower than that of
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conventional mortgages with the minimum being at 3.5%. In return to providing insurance
for mortgages with such a low down-payment, FHA charges borrowers an insurance premium.
In 2014, annual mortgage insurance premiums cannot exceed 1.55% of loan balance, and
upfront premiums cannot exceed 3%.
2.4 Data Sources and Sample Description
2.4.1 Ginnie Mae MBS Disclosure Data
The primary dataset in this chapter is constructed from monthly mortgage-backed securities
data disclosed by Ginnie Mae. In order to improve transparency and attract global capital,
beginning in October 2013 Ginnie Mae began releasing loan-level data of mortgages that
belong to active mortgage-backed securities. Mortgages securitized by Ginnie Mae originate
exclusively from four government-backed mortgage programs, administered by the Federal
Housing Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Office of Public and Indian
Housing, and the Department of Agriculture. Respectively these loans are abbreviated FHA,
VA, PIH, and RD, and they differ from conventional loans in several dimensions, including
targeted borrower demographics and credit requirements.
In this chapter, I focus only on the subset of FHA mortgages because these loans are fully
insured, and lenders originating FHA loans are protected from borrower credit risks. The
unpaid principal amount is fully reimbursed to the lender in case the borrower defaults on a
FHA-approved loan. On the other hand, VA, PIH, and RD loans only provide lenders with
partial insurance, hence only a fraction of the unpaid principal amount can be reimbursed.
The full insurance feature of FHA loans alleviates concerns of risk-based pricing and ensures
that dispersion in interest rates is not predominantly driven by variation in borrower default
risks.
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The loan-level data disclosed by Ginnie Mae contains fairly rich information. For each
observation, contractual data, such as the original principal amount, the loan-to-value, and
the term of the loan, are included. Some information about the borrower financial situation,
such as her credit score and her ratio of debt expense to income, is also observed. Data on
the lender or banking institution that originates the loan as well as its geographical location
is also included. Moreover, because Ginnie Mae identifies the mortgage pool to which each
loan belongs, it is possible to use this pool-level information to retrieve secondary-market
data about each observed loan, such as the coupon and yield rates of the mortgage-backed
security created by the loan.
2.4.2 Bloomberg Mortgage-backed Security Data
I supplement the primary loan-level Ginnie Mae dataset with data on yields of mortgage-
backed securities collected from Bloomberg. In some empirical specifications presented later
in Section 2.6.3, an approximation of the marginal cost is needed. Data on the secondary
mortgage market would be very useful for that purpose. The rate at which mortgage lenders
borrow funds from the secondary market can be used as a measure for the marginal cost of
lending, an approach also employed by Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014).
The loan-level Ginnie Mae dataset provides information on the coupon rate of the
mortgage-backed security to which each individual mortgage in the sample belongs. The
coupon rate shows the face interest rate that investors of the MBS are entitled to, and is
one measure of the marginal cost of lending used in Section 2.6.3. However, because it is the
face interest rate, the coupon rate is only accurate insofar as the security is traded at par,
a requirement that does not necessarily hold for many of the Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed
securities during the sampled time period. For this reason, I additionally employ the yield
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Figure 2.1: Ginnie Mae MBS Yield and the Treasury Rate
loans using the observed coupon rate and issuance date.
The collected yield rates suggests that Ginnie Mae MBS are effectively risk-free invest-
ments for investors in the secondary market. In Figure 2.1, I graph the time series of yield
rates of Ginnie Mae MBS compared to the Treasury rates. The figure shows that Ginnie Mae
MBS yield rates typically fall between the 10-year and 20-year Treasury rates. This obser-
vation is consistent with investors regarding Ginnie Mae MBS as risk-free as Treasury bonds
but with a different maturity date. The maturity date of Ginnie MBS is determined by the
prepayment and refinance propensity of its underlying mortgages, which may be reasonably
regarded as being between 10 and 20 years.
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2.4.3 Sample Description
Using the Ginnie Mae loan-level dataset, I make several restrictions in order to arrive at
the final sample. The Ginnie Mae dataset contains loans insured by agencies other than the
Federal Housing Administration, but these loans are only partially insured and hence are
dropped from the sample. I also exclude refinances and focus only on loans that are new
home purchases. The interest rate of refinanced loans are likely dependent on the interest
rate of the original loan, which is unfortunately unobserved. I also keep only loans with
a common 30-year amortization schedule and a fixed interest rate. Discount points may
also affect the distribution of transacted interest rates in ways that are unrelated to price
discrimination; therefore I drop loans where the borrower opts to purchase discount points.
Using these restrictions, the Ginnie Mae loan-level dataset consists of 790,994 observa-
tions. The empirical analysis calls for quantile regressions, but running quantile regression
on such a large dataset would be prohibitively slow. Therefore, I choose a random 5% sample
of 39,550 observations in order to make the estimation feasible.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Continuous Variables
Variables Measurement Unit Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation
Transacted Interest Rate basis points 39,550 425.25 425.00 35.44
Credit Score n/a 39,468 682.63 675.00 44.80
Original Principal Balance $1000 39,550 178.63 157.00 93.98
Loan-to-Value % 38,479 95.33 96.50 4.55
Debt Expense Ratio % 38,091 40.87 41.75 8.94
Coupon Rate of MBS basis points 39,550 387.45 400.00 37.79
Yield Rate of MBS basis points 38,824 256.27 255.00 30.81
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the summary statistics for continuous and discrete variables
observed for each loan contract. Transacted interest rate, which is a measure of contract
price, average at 425 basis points with a standard deviation of around 35 basis points. Hence,
even for a sample of fully insured loans, there is evidence of dispersion in transacted interest
rates. As variation in default risk is eliminated, observed price dispersion can be plausibly
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attributed to other factors. As argued in Chapter 1, other factors that drive observed
price dispersion may include variations in marginal costs, lender quality, and search costs of
borrowers.
Table 2.2: Summary Description of Discrete Variables
Loan Observables Values % of Contracts




Down-Payment Assistance No 88.97%
Yes 11.03%
First-time Homebuyer No 32.51%
Yes 67.49%




Origination Source Broker 13.23%
Correspondent 54.15%
Retail 32.62%
For each loan, the data also provide information on the credit score of the borrower, the
loan’s original principal balance, the loan-to-value ratio, the total debt to income ratio of
the borrower. Additionally, I also observe discrete variables such as the number of borrowers
undersigning the contract, a dummy indicating if the borrower receives gift funds for the
down payment, a dummy indicating if the borrower is a first-time homebuyer, the number
of units in the mortgaged property, and the origination channel of the mortgage. These are
loan observables that I will later use in our empirical analysis.
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2.5 A Model of Mortgage Shopping
2.5.1 Overview
In order to motivate the empirical approach, here I describe a stylized model of consumer
search in mortgage markets.1 The model is related to that of Stahl (1989); in the presence
of positive consumer search costs, price dispersion arises as an equilibrium mixed strategy
adopted by firms. To allow for price discrimination, I specify multiple consumer types who
differ in their level of search costs and get charged different levels of markup in equilibrium.
The analytical solution of the equilibrium price distribution is based on Janssen, Moraga-
González and Wildenbeest (2005). The model produces restrictions on comparative statics
of prices that later will be used as motivations of the empirical analysis.
Let us consider a geographical market and suppose there is a continuum of consumers
in this market. Each consumer demands exactly one mortgage and has an inelastic demand
D(p) = 1. A more flexible demand specification does not qualitatively change the central
results as long as the revenue function pD(p) has a unique maximum at p̂, and that for all
p < p̂, pD(p) is strictly increasing.
Each consumer belongs to a specific type θ that incurs a marginal cost cθ on lenders. For
each consumer type, there is a fraction µθ > 0 of consumers who have a zero search cost and
are referred to as shoppers. The rest 1−µθ fraction of consumers have a positive search cost
sθ > 0. The inclusion of shoppers aims to capture the population of consumers who derive
intrinsic satisfaction from shopping. For each type θ, non-shoppers have a common search
cost, hence the search cost distribution is degenerate, and the model can be seen as a special
case of Stahl (1996). Each borrower type can be fully described by the three parameters µθ,
1This model borrows heavily from Michael Grubb’s lecture notes in his Graduate Industrial Organization




Let N denote the number of different mortgage lenders in the market, who all have an
identical production function. I assume that the mortgage product is homogeneous across
lenders, but mortgages can have differing marginal costs that are induced by variations in
the borrowers’ cost parameter cθ. This cost parameter cθ is fixed throughout the shopping
occasion; the model therefore posits that the borrower has already decided on all non-price
dimension of the mortgage contract prior to shopping. Terms such as the downpayment size,
the loan-to-value ratio, the length of the mortgage, as well as borrower’s characteristics such
as income and credit score are all fixed, and the borrower is only searching along the price
dimension.
Furthermore, the assumption of homogeneous lenders also implies that any quality varia-
tions across mortgage lenders will not be considered. In reality, quality differentiation across
lenders may be present and is a potential source of price dispersion. However, the homo-
geneity assumption greatly simplifies the solution of the model by allowing the focus on
symmetric equilibria.
Lenders will simultaneously choose prices (p1, . . . , pN). To facilitate solving the model,
each consumer type is regarded as a separate sub-market, and strategic interactions between
lenders are confined to within sub-markets only. The price vector then can be more precisely
described with the subscript θ: (pθ1, . . . , pθN). However, since solving the model is mechan-
ically the same across sub-markets, from here on I will omit the subscript θ in solving for
the equilibrium price vector. The solution presented below can be seen as being applicable
across all sub-markets.
I adopt a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) solution concept. A SNE solution is
plausible since lenders are homogeneous and would follow the same strategy in equilibrium.
The choice of solution concept is an implicit assumption about what consumers know prior
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to search. Under a SNE, consumers are assumed to know the equilibrium CDF of posted
price F (p), but not the empirical distribution of prices actually being charged. Papers that
adopt a SNE solution concepts include Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989). On the
other hand, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Rob (1985) adopt a Stackelberg paradigm, in
which firms move first and set prices, after which consumers are informed of the empirical
price distribution before engaging in search. The SNE concept is chosen in this chapter since
it is natural to assume that mortgage borrowers should have no information regarding actual
prices without searching.
2.5.2 Borrowers Problem
Prior to searching, borrowers know the CDF of the posted price distribution, denoted here




denote the support of this CDF. To learn the actual price that each
lender charges, borrowers have to visit that lender. The visit is free for shoppers and incurs
a cost s for non-shoppers. Borrowers search with perfect recall and without replacement.
The first visit is free for all borrowers, ensuring that all borrowers participate in the market.
Because shoppers have zero search cost, they will always search and find the firm offering
the lowest price in the market. On the other hand, consider the non-shoppers who have
positive search cost. As quality differentiation acorss lenders is assumed away, borrowers’
utility is a function of price only. In this setting, the optimal strategy is to search until a











The equality defines the reservation price because it is the price at which the benefit of the
marginal search equals to the cost of searching. The second line follows because of inelastic
demand D(p) = 1.
It is possible to show that in equilibrium, p̄ ≤ r, or that the whole support of the posted
price distribution is less than the reservation price. The claim that p̄ ≤ r can be established
by contradiction. Suppose that p̄ > r is an equilibrium, then a firm charging p̄ would always
induce consumers to search; its consumers would always find a better price elsewhere, and
the firm would have zero profit. However, by deviating to p instead, the firm would earn a
positive profit. This positive profit at p is guaranteed because as shown in Appendix B.1,
any equilibrium will necessarily have p > c. Thus a firm charging p̄ > r is not maximizing
profit, a contradiction to p̄ > r being an equilibrium.
Since p̄ ≤ r, non-shoppers would always only search exactly once: they are guaranteed to
find a satisfying price from the very first search. In equilibrium, only shoppers would search
more than once. The implication that only shoppers search makes the model thematically
similar to other consumer search models, such as Varian (1980), in which each firm has a
captive customer population and compete against each others for the informed customers.
In the mortgage search model presented here, each firm has an equal chance of capturing a
non-shopper regardless of the price it charges. Setting a lower price makes it more probable
that the firm can also capture the shoppers, who would only buy from the lowest price lender.
In these types of models where a captive consumer segment exists alongside with informed
consumers, a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is unobtainable (Anderson and Renault, 2016).
However, a mixed strategy NE exists.
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2.5.3 Equilibrium
In this model, the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy price equilibrium is shown in Stahl






If a lender charges price p, it has a (1 − F (p))N−1 probability of being the lowest price
lender and capture the shoppers. On the other hand, because non-shoppers do not search,
this lender will capture 1/N of the fraction of non-shoppers. Equilibrium profit as a function
of price would be:
π(p) = (p− c)
[
µ(1− F (p))N−1 + 1− µ
N
]
Note that the above equation describes profit in a given market segment (sub-market) even
though the segment subscript θ has been suppressed. Solving this equation for F (p) yields:









Two special cases arise when the price charged is at the bounds of the price support:











In a mixed strategy equilibrium, π(p) = π(p) = π(p̄). Substituting π(p) by π(p̄) in the
equation for 1− F (p):

























The final step involves solving for the upper-bound of the price support. Once a consumer
samples p̄, the expected price saving from the next search would be p̄ − E[p]. Because
shoppers are indifferent to search once they sample p̄, the optimal stopping rule is satisfied
and we have p̄ − E[p] = s. Janssen et al. (2005) presents a solution for p̄ by characterizing













Equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) jointly characterize the price distribution in a symmetric
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Although the subscript θ is omitted, we should view this
equilibrium as occurring separately in each market segment θ.
2I learned of this technique from Michael Grubb’s lecture notes. See also the previous footnote.
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2.5.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, I examine several comparative statics of prices that later will be used in the
empirical analysis. These comparative statics are derived for transacted instead of posted
prices, as the data on mortgage contracts only reveal transacted prices. In order to derive the
CDF of transacted prices, consider a consumer i who obtains a transacted price ptransi . The
probability that this transacted price is less than a certain value can be written as follows:
Pr(ptransi < x) = Pr(i ∈ shoppers)× Pr(pmin ≤ x | i ∈ shoppers)
+ Pr(i ∈ non-shoppers)× Pr(pposted < x | i ∈ non-shoppers)
Therefore, let F trans denote the CDF of transacted prices, Fmin the CDF of the minimum
posted price, and F posted the CDF of posted prices. The CDF of transacted prices can then
be expressed as a function of the fraction of shoppers µ and the other two price CDFs:





























Consider an implicit function defining transacted prices ptrans in terms of marginal cost c,
search cost s, fraction of shoppers µ, and quantile value τ . By definition of a CDF, this
implicit function holds true for each quantile value τ ∈ (0, 1):
F trans(ptrans, c, s, µ)− τ = 0
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem on the above function produces the relevant com-
parative statics of transacted prices. The resulting comparative statics are provided below,
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and a more detailed derivation of these results can be found in Appendix B.2. In all math-
ematical expressions here on, prices refer exclusively to transacted prices. I therefore omit










As Appendix B.2 also shows, closed form solutions can be obtained for the first derivative










Taken together, the above equations imply that as quantile values τ increases, the first
derivative of transacted prices with respect to marginal cost remains unchanged, the first
derivative with respect to search cost increases, and the first derivative with respect to
fraction of shoppers decreases. The direction of change of these first derivatives across
quantiles forms the theoretical basis that motivates our use of quantile regressions in the
empirical analysis.
As shown in Appendix B.3, equation (2.9) implies that transacted price is linear in
marginal cost and search cost.3 We can expressed transacted price as:
p = c+ β(τ,N, µ)s (2.10)
for some β(τ,N, µ) = ∂p
∂s
. The linearity lends further support for the use of quantile regres-
3Thanks to Michael Grubb for suggesting and actually proving the linear relationship between transacted
price, marginal cost, and search cost.
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sions, where transacted price are assumed to be linear in the independent variables.
In Appendix B.4, I simulate a dataset of transacted interest rates, search cost, and
marginal cost. I then show that equations (2.8) and (2.9) can be supported by running the
appropriate quantile regressions on the simulated data. Results in this appendix suggest
that the theoretical model, in the form of equations (2.8) and (2.9) can be tested using
observational data.
2.6 Empirical Analysis
2.6.1 Empirical Specification of the Model
In this section, I discuss a few further specification issues of the model that was developed
in Section 2.5 before applying it to the data. Let X denote the set of loan-level variables
observed in the data. The conditional quantile function (CQF) of transacted prices p can
then be defined given the vector of regressors X:
Qτ (p | X) = F−1p (τ | X)
where F−1p is the inverse of the CDF of transacted prices that was derived in equation (2.4).
A standard quantile regression would specify the conditional quantile function as a linear
model with parameters βτ to be estimated:





where the subscript k indexes each specific regressor Xk. For ease of notation, let
pτ ≡ Qτ (p | X, βτ )
The main empirical goal is assessing how the coefficients βτ vary across different quantiles.
In order to achieve this objective, I first write βτ as a partial derivative of transacted prices
with respect to a loan observable Xk, holding other observables fixed. Applying the chain




















How the coefficients βτ vary would depend on how each of the terms in the above equation
change across quantiles. The analysis so far has established the sign of changes in the
partial derivatives of prices with respect to model parameters c, µ, and s. More specifically,
in equations (2.5), (2.7), (2.6), and in Appendix B.2, we showed that as quantile value τ
increases, ∂pτ/∂c is constant, ∂pτ/∂µ is negative and decreasing, and ∂pτ/∂s is positive and
increasing.
Depending on the sign and magnitude of the remaining derivatives, ∂c/∂Xk, ∂µ/∂Xk,
and ∂s/∂Xk, we would expect different directions of change in βτ across quantiles. These
partial derivatives with respect to X represent the mapping between observable data X and
model parameters c, µ, and s. The magnitude of these partial derivatives can be interpreted
as how Xk is affiliated with c, s, and µ.
4 These parameters are not observed; as a result, it
is difficult to assess this mapping empirically and quantify it.
In order to test the model’s predictions, I make a few empirical assumptions on the
derivatives of c, µ, and s with respect to X. Specifically, I assume that across all quantile












for some constants Tck, Tµk, and Tsk. Changes in certain loan and borrower observables,
such as credit score or loan-to-value ratio, are almost certainly associated with changes in
the lending cost, as well as changes in how likely the borrower would search for mortgages.
The above assumption allows for such changes in the model parameters c, µ, and s to happen
as a result of changing loan observables, but restrict the rate-of-change to be constant across
all quantiles of transacted price. The stable relationship between c, µ, s, and observables
X allows us to build upon qualitative results of Section 2.5 to derive predictions on the
estimated quantile regression coefficients.
Particularly regarding the partial derivative with respect to the fraction of shoppers µ, I
further assume that Tµk ≈ 0, or equivalently:
∂µ
∂Xk
≈ 0 for all Xk (2.13)
In other words, the fraction of shoppers is relatively stable across different values of observ-
ables X. As loan observables such as credit score, loan-to-value, and original loan balance
vary, borrowers would be classified as belonging to different customer segments θ. I maintain
that across observed values of these loan characteristics, the fraction of customers with zero
search cost remains near a constant.
To provide evidence in support of this assumption, I calculate the fraction of shoppers
µ and examine how it varies across values of loan observables. To this end, I rely on data
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provided in a report by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Housing
Finance Agency (2017). This report presents summary statistics gathered from the National
Survey of Mortgage Originations (NSMO). This survey is administered using a representative
sample of mortgage borrowers who report to Experian, one of the three national credit
repositories. I focus on a particular data item in this report, namely the percentage of
borrowers who applied to only one lender during the mortgage shopping occasion.
In order to calculate the implied fraction of shoppers µ from this data, first recall that
in the equilibrium characterized in Section 2.5, non-shoppers would search exactly once,
and shoppers may search once or more. Shoppers, having a zero search cost, would only
stop searching when they find the lowest price in the market. Therefore, the population of
borrowers who apply at one lender would consists of all non-shoppers as well as some shoppers
who happen to find the lowest market price in their very first search. The probability of
finding this lowest price is 1/N in the first search, where N is the total number of lenders in
the market. Letting H denote the percentage of all borrowers who apply to one lender, we
have:







Setting N = 20, the average number of lenders observed in each state, I calculate the fraction
of shoppers µ. Table 2.3 reports how µ varies across values of three loan characteristics that
are observed in both the sample and in the NSMO report: credit score, the loan’s original
principal balance, and a dummy indicating if the borrower is a first-time homebuyer.
In Table 2.3, the implied fraction of shoppers stays at a relatively constant level for all the
three reported loan characteristics. The range of variation of µ is about 5.2 (= 27.1− 21.9)
percentage points across values of credit score, 7.9 percentage points across values of original
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Table 2.3: Variation in the Fraction of Shoppers across Loan Observables
Loan Values Fraction of Borrowers Fraction of Borrowers who Calculated Fraction
(NMSO Survey Data) (µ)
Credit < 620 3.4% 76.7% 24.5%
Score 620− 679 49.1% 74.3% 27.1%
680− 719 25.3% 75.8% 25.5%
720+ 19.2% 79.2% 21.9%
Original < 50k 1.1% 83.2% 17.7%
Principal 50k − 150k 44% 78.6% 22.5%
Balance 150k − 300k 44.9% 77.2% 24.0%
300k+ 9.4% 75.7% 25.6%
First-time Yes 67.5% 71.0% 30.5%
Homebuyer No 32.5% 76.7% 24.5%
Data for the fraction of borrowers who apply at one lender come from the National Survey of
Mortgage Originations in 2014. The corresponding fraction of shoppers are calculated using equa-
tion (2.14) assuming N = 20.
principal balance, and 5.5 percentage points across groups of first-time buyers and non-first-
time buyers. The degree of variation of µ actually present in the data may even be smaller,
because as indicated in the third column of Table 2.3, the majority of loan observables
tend to concentrate near their central values. Hence the variation in µ calculated using
the bounds would likely be an overstated representation of the actual variation. The small
degree of variation in µ across values of loan observables provides suggestive evidence for the
assumption in equation (2.13).
2.6.2 Predictions of the Model
Once equation (2.13) is specified, predicting the changes in βτ across quantiles amounts to
determining only ∂c/∂Xk and ∂s/∂Xk for each loan observable Xk. The quantile regression














where Tck and Tsk denote the partial derivatives of c and s with respect to Xk, which are
assumed to be constants. The above equation is a simplification of equation (2.12) using
the assumption that ∂µ/∂Xk = 0 and a result shown earlier that ∂pτ/∂c = 1. As argued in
Section 2.5.4 and Appendix B.3, the linearity of transacted price in Tck and Tsk is supported
by the theoretical model.
For each specific loan observable, Tck and Tsk may either be zero or non-zero. Therefore,
there are four different possible scenarios. Because ∂pτ/∂s is increasing across quantiles τ ,
using equation (2.15) it is now possible to make testable predictions on how βkτ would vary
across quantiles τ of transacted price.
Table 2.4 presents these testable predictions. There are four possible combinations of
values for Tck and Tsk based on the zero and non-zero classification, but only three possible
outcomes for the quantile regression coefficients βτ . If Tck = Tsk = 0, then loan observableXk
is unrelated with c, s, and µ, and therefore would be irrelevant in determining transaction
price. It follows that the regression coefficient βkτ should be zero across all quantiles of
transacted price. If Tck 6= 0 and Tsk = 0, then Xk is correlated only with the marginal
cost parameter but not the search cost parameter. Equation (2.15) would then implies that
βkτ = Tck, so the regression coefficients βkτ should equal to a non-zero constant across all
quantiles. Finally, consider the case when Tsk 6= 0, or Xk is correlated with the search
cost parameter. Because ∂pτ/∂s is increasing, βkτ should be either increasing or decreasing
monotonically across quantiles depending on the sign of Tsk.
Based on the information presented in Table 2.4, one natural way to test the model
predictions is to distinguish between cases that βkτ is constant versus otherwise. The dis-
tinction occurs depending on whether each loan observable is correlated with search cost
s or not. If we can reasonably establish that a variable Xk is correlated with search cost,
then its coefficient in a quantile regression of transacted price should vary monotonically.
On the contrary, if Xk is deemed to be not correlated with s, then its coefficient should be
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constant, zero and non-zero included. This approach, based on the determining how each
loan observable relates with search cost level, is straightforward and clean in its predictions
on regression coefficients. It is, however, difficult to implement since borrowers’ search cost
s is not observed in the data.
Table 2.4: Predictions of the Model
Values of Tck Values of Tsk Predictions on
Estimated Coefficients βτ
Zero Zero βτ = 0 for all τ
Zero Non-Zero βτ varies monotonically as τ ↑
Non-Zero Zero βτ = Non-Zero Constant for all τ
Non-Zero Non-Zero βτ varies monotonically as τ ↑
Predictions in the right-most column refer to how quantile regression coefficients βτ
would change as quantile values τ is increased. More details are provided in Sec-
tions 2.5 and 2.6 of the paper.
I therefore pursue an alternative strategy that consists of first determining empirically
the relationship between a loan observable and a measure of marginal cost. I then implement
a quantile regression of transacted price and verifying if the estimated regression coefficients
are consistent with those outlined in Table 2.4. For any loan observable Xk, a quantile
regression of transacted price should produce coefficients that either vary monotonically or
equal to a constant. Whether that constant is zero or non-zero has to be consistent with
whether Xk is associated c or not. If Xk is determined to be not related to c, then the
constant outcome refers exclusively to zero. On the other hand, if Xk is retlated to c, then
the constant regression coefficients should be non-zero. In all cases, estimated coefficients
should not exhibit non-monotonic variations across quantiles.
The model’s prediction regarding the quantile regression coefficients βτk of transacted
rates on loan observables Xk could be summed up in the following proposition, which can
be obtained immediately from the fact that βkτ = Tck + (∂p/∂s)Tsk.
Proposition. Given a loan observable Xk and marginal cost c:
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• βk = 0 across all quantile values τ implies that marginal cost do not vary with Xk.
• βk 6= 0 and constant across all quantile values τ implies that marginal cost do vary
with Xk.
• If βk does not fit into either of the above cases (i.e. when Tsk 6= 0), it has to vary
monotonically with τ (monotonically increasing if Tsk > 0 or monotonically decreasing
if Tsk < 0).
I adopt the above testing strategy primarily due to its feasibility. Whereas search cost
levels are not observed, some measures of marginal cost are. In particular, I observe the
yield rate of the mortgage-backed security for which each sampled loan is serving as the
collateral. Using the MBS yield rate as a proxy for the marginal cost of lending, I estimate
the relationship between loan observables and the cost parameter, and verify if results from
a quantile regression of transacted price would be consistent with the model.
2.6.3 Identifying Determinants of Marginal Cost
In order to implement the test outlined in Section 2.6.2, the first step is to determine which
loan observables Xk is associated with marginal cost c in the sense that the derivative value
Tck is non-zero. To this end, a simple OLS regression of marginal cost measurements on
loan observables should suffice; however, since the marginal cost of lending is not directly
observed, a proxy for it is necessary.
Given that mortgage lenders operate as middle-men channeling funds from the secondary
mortgage market to borrowers in the primary market, useful proxies for marginal cost could
be obtained from the rates that lenders borrow to fund their loans. To this end, I employ
historical yield rates of mortgage-backed securities from Bloomberg, and match it with the
sampled Ginnie Mae loans using the original date and coupon rate. As described in Sec-
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tion 2.4.2, the yield rate accounts for sale price of the mortgage-backed security at the time
of sale from the lender to investors. This sale price could be different than the face value
of the MBS, and needs to be accounted for in determining the true cost of borrowing funds
from the secondary market. Because the yield rate accounts for variations in sale price, it is
arguably a better measure of marginal cost than the coupon rate.
I then run the following OLS regression of yield rate on loan observables:
yield = β0 + β1credscore+ β2opb+ β3ltv + β4debtexp+ β5numborrow
+ β6downassist+ β7firstbuy + β8numunit+ β9controls+ error (2.16)
where credscore refers to the borrower’s FICO credit score; opb is the loan’s original prin-
cipal balance measured in thousands of dollars; ltv is the loan-to-value ratio; debtexp is the
borrower’s ratio of total debt expense to income; numborrow is the number of borrowers
undersigning the contract; downassist is a dummy variable indicating if the borrower re-
ceives gift funds for the down; firstbuy is a dummy indicating if the borrower is a first-time
homebuyer; numunit is the number of units in the real estate property being mortgaged;
controls refer to additional controls in the regression, including a set of dummies indicating
the origination channel (broker, retail, or correspondent), state, and month of origination.
The regression is run separately using either the coupon or yield rate of mortgage-backed
securities as the dependent variable.
In the above regression, loan observables whose coefficient is non-zero would correspond-
ingly have non-zero partial derivative value Tck. According to the model’s predictions in
Section 2.6.2, in a quantile regression of transacted interest rate, these same loan observ-
ables would have coefficients that either vary monotonically or equal to a non-zero constant
across all quantiles. On the other hand, observables not varying with marginal cost would
have coefficients that change monotonically across quantiles or equal to zero. I run the regres-
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sion in equation (2.16) and distinguish between independent variables that have statistically
significant coefficients and those who do not. In order to examine economic significance, I run
an additional regression, almost identical to that in in equation (2.16), but using variables
standardized by their mean and standard deviation.
Results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.5. Most statistically significant es-
timates, except that for the first-time homebuyer indicator, are signficant at the 1% level.
This indicates evidence that the partial derivative of marginal cost with respect to statisti-
cally signifcant variables is non-zero. These variables include: credit score, original principal
balance, loan-to-value, down payment assistance dummy, first-time homebuyer status, and
number of units. On the other hand, debt expense to income ratio and number of borrowers
do not seem to be correlated with marginal cost. Together the independent variables explain
about half the variation in the yield rate (R2 = 0.50).
In the standardized specification, as expected, the statistical significance of estimates is
consistent with results in the non-standardized regression. In the standardized regression,
coefficient estimates represent the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the explana-
tory variable on the explained variables yield and coupon rates, which are also standardized.
Loan-to-value ratio and number of units, despite being highly statistically significant, seem
to exhibit little economic significance. A one standard deviation change in loan-to-value, for
instance, is associated with a .014 standard deviation reduction in yield rates.
Estimates in Table 2.5 suggest that many loan characteristics are related to the yield rate
of Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security. This relationship exists even though Ginnie Mae
mortgage-backed securities typically trade near the risk-free rate, as shown in Section 2.4.2.
I speculate that, the explanation behind these seemingly contradictory observations is that
loan characteristics affect the prepayment risk of mortgages, and consequently the price and
yield rate of MBS. If a certain loan characteristic is positively correlated with prepayment
probability, then it will be negatively correlated with the term structure of the mortgage.
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Table 2.5: Regression of MBS Yield Rate on Observables
Dependent Variable Yield Rate Yield Rate (Standardized)
Credit Score 0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)




Debt Expense Ratio -0.0075 -0.0022
(0.013) (0.004)
Number of Borrowers 0.12 0.0020
(0.224) (0.004)
Down-Payment Assistance -2.93∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.004)
First-time Homebuyer 0.49∗ 0.0074∗
(0.246) (0.004)
Number of Units -1.98∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.004)
Origination Channel Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 36,305 36,305
R2 0.50 0.50
Standard errors in parentheses. In the standardized specification, all variables, in-
cluding the independent variables, are standardized around their mean.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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An increase in this observed characteristic will lower the price of the MBS and increase its
yield.
For the three loan characteristics (credit score, principal balance, and loan-to-value)
whose relationship with prepayment has been analyzed in the previous literature, the ev-
idence is supportive of the above explanation. For instance, LaCour-Little (1999), using
data from an anonymous loan-servicing firm, documents that loan size and borrower’s credit
score are positively associated with prepayment probabilities. The author also finds that
current-level loan-to-value ratio has a positive association with prepayment, although loan-
to-value ratio at the time of origination does not. In another study of prepayment loan
characteristics, Peristiani, Bennett, Monsen, Peach and Raiff (1997) find that an increase
in loan-to-value ratio decreases prepayment probabilities; their result is consistent with the
results in Table 2.5 and suggests that loan characteristics may ultimately affect yield rates
through their association with prepayment risk.
Since there is no clear basis on which to evaluate the magnitude of economic significance, I
use statistical significance in determining if a loan variable is correlated with marginal cost.
In the next section, I use this information to verify if a quantile regression of transacted
interest rates produce results that are consistent with what the model predicts in Table 2.4.
2.6.4 Quantile Regression Results
I run the following quantile regression of transacted interest rate on loan observables:
Qτ (p | βτ ) = β0τ + β1τcredscore+ β2τopb+ β3τ ltv + β4τdebtexp+ β5τnumborrow
+ β6τdownassist+ β7τfirstbuy + β8τnumunit+ β9τcontrols (2.17)
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for quantile values τ ∈ {0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95}. Explanation of independent variables are
given in Section 2.6.3. The quantile regression shows the marginal effects of covariates on
the conditional quantile function of transacted interest rate, as described in equation (2.11).
Results of this quantile regression are presented in Table 2.6. Below I discuss the results
concerning each covariate and to what extent they support the theoretical model outlined
in Section 2.5.
Table 2.6: Quantile Regression of Interest Rates on Observable Loan Characteristics
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Credit Score -0.11∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
Original Principal Balance -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Loan-to-Value 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Debt Expense Ratio 0.06∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02∗ -0.04 -0.10∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
Number of Borrowers 0.17 0.17 -0.19 -0.35 0.18
(0.51) (0.40) (0.39) (0.47) (0.80)
Down-payment Assistance 2.36∗∗ 4.43∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 7.67∗∗∗ 5.51∗∗∗
(1.01) (0.90) (0.86) (1.13) (1.46)
First-time Homebuyer -0.41 -0.03 0.01 -0.44 -2.51∗∗
(0.59) (0.35) (0.41) (0.51) (1.07)
Number of Units -0.93 1.30 3.47∗∗∗ 5.32∗∗∗ 8.14∗∗∗
(1.04) (0.96) (0.74) (0.92) (2.49)
Origination Channel Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,963 36,963 36,963 36,963 36,963
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Credit Score
A one unit increase in the borrower’s FICO credit score is associated with a 0.16 basis point
decrease in median transacted rates, with lower effects in the lower quantiles and larger
effects in the upper quantiles. The estimated coefficients decrease monotonically throughout
the quantiles, from 0.11 in the .05 regression to 0.21 in the .95 regression. A Wald test rejects
that the coefficients are equal at the 1% level. As discussed in Section 2.6.3, credit score
is likely to be correlated with marginal cost, and a pattern of monotonic decrease across
quantiles is consistent with predictions of theoretical model.
Original Principal Balance
In the median regression, a $1000 increase in the loan amount is associated with a .04
basis point decrease in the transacted interest rates. The magnitude of this coefficient
estimate may seem small at first, but could be economically meaningful as the principal
balance is typically several hundreds of thousands of dollars. The average loan amount is
around $178,000 with a standard deviation of about $93,000. The estimated coefficients
also show a pattern of monotonic decrease, with the largest values being -.03 in the .05
quantile regression, and the smallest being -.06 in the .95 quantile regression. All estimates
are statistically different, and a test would reject that these coefficients are constant across
quantiles. As original principal balance is shown to be correlated with marginal cost, this
result also lends support to the model.
Loan-to-Value Ratio
Estimated coefficients for the loan-to-value ratio shows a different pattern compared to those
obtained for credit score and original principal balance. The estimated coefficients seem to
display a non-monotonic pattern across quantiles, with the lowest estimate being .13 in the
median regression. The estimates seem to increase in both lower and upper quantiles to
.20 in the .05 quantile regression, and .21 in the .95 quantile regression. However, a Wald
test shows that a null hypothesis that coefficients across quantiles are all equal produces a
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p-value of 0.68 and thus cannot be rejected. Furthermore, a separate Wald test rejects the
null that all coefficients are equal to 0, with a p-value less than 10−4. Hence, the estimated
coefficients for the loan-to-value ratio is likely to be a non-zero constant across quantiles.
Because the loan-to-value ratio is shown to be correlated with marginal cost, this pattern of
estimated coefficients is also consistent with the model.
Debt Expense to Income Ratio
This is the only loan variable whose estimated coefficients seem to change signs as the quantile
value is increased. The margainal effect of this loan osbervable on interest rate declines from
an increase of 0.06 basis points in the .05 regression to virtually zero in the .75 regression.
In the .95 quantile regression, the marginal effect become becomes negative and significant;
a one percentage point increase in the debt expense to income ratio is associated with a
-.10 basis point change in transacted interest rate at the very top quantile. All coefficient
estimates, except that of the .75 regression, are significant at the 10% level. As the debt
expense to income ratio is shown not to be correlated with marginal cost, this pattern of
monotonic decrease also fits with the model.
Number of Borrowers
The number of borrowers undersigning the mortgage loan does not seem to affect the trans-
acted interest rate at any of the quantile considered. Table 2.6 shows that the estimated
coefficient for this loan observable is not statistically significant in any of the columns. The
point estimate ranges from -.35 in the .75 quantile regression to .18 in the .95 quantile re-
gression. A Wald test assuming that all the coefficients are all simultaneously equal to zero
yields a p-value of .75; the null hypothesis therefore cannot be rejected. As the number of
borrowers is one of the two covariates that are insignificant in the marginal cost regression,




This covariate is correlated with marginal cost according to results in Table 2.5. Its marginal
effects on transacted interest rate must therefore vary monotonically or equal a non-zero
constant across quantiles. Results in Table 2.6 confirm this prediction. Whether the borrower
receives a down payment assistance seems to be strongly associated with all quantiles of
transacted interest rate. The coefficient estimates for this independent variable increases
steadily from 2.36 in the .05 quantile regression to 7.67 in the .75 quantile regression. At
first sight, there seems to be a decrease at the very top quantile; the coefficient estimate in the
.95 quantile is 5.51. However, a Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimates are
equal at the .75 and .95 quantiles. It is then plausible to argue that the coefficient estimates
follow a monotonic pattern of increasing values across quantiles, which is consistent with the
model.
First-time Homebuyer Status
The coefficient estimates for this loan observable is statistically indistinguishable from zero
at most quantiles of transacted rates, before becoming significant at the very top quantile.
In the .95 quantile regression, a borrower who is a first-time homebuyer would receive a rate
that is 2.51 basis points lower than a borrower who is a repeated homebuyer. Therefore,
the quantile coefficients for first-time homebuyer status also express a pattern of monotonic
decrease as we move up the quantiles. Even though in Section 2.6.3 it cannot be determined
unambiguously if this loan observable is correlated with marginal cost, a pattern of monotonic
variation across quantiles ensures consistency with the model in either case.
Number of Units
Given that this loan variable is a correlate of marginal cost, one would expect its quantile
regression coefficients to be increasing or a non-zero constant. The .05 and .25 coefficient
estimates for the number of units is statistically indistinct from zero. However, as the higher
quantiles of transacted rates are considered, the coefficients becomes significant and also
express a pattern of monotonic increase. In the median regression, having an additional unit
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in the mortgaged property would increase interest rate by 3.47 basis points. The marginal
effect is extended to 5.32 and 8.14 basis points respectively in the .75 and .95 regressions.
A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal with a p-value of 10−4.
I conclude that the coefficient estimates are monotonically increasing across quantiles, an
outcome that is consistent with the model.
Summary
Estimates from a quantile regression of transacted interest rates on loan observables have so
far largely supported predictions of the model. For six of the observables under considera-
tion: credit score, original principal balance, debt expense to income ratio, down payment
assistance, first-time buyer, and number of units, the coefficient estimates shows a monotonic
pattern across quantile. The coefficients of loan-to-value, a loan observable that correlates
with marginal cost, are likely to be a non-zero constant. The coefficients of number of bor-
rowers, which does not correlate with marginal cost, is approximately zero throughout all
quantiles.
In theory, one can also examine the pattern of coefficient estimates for control variables
included in the regression equation 2.17. These control variables include indicators for the
origination channel, the state where the property is located, and the monthly date of origi-
nation. I decide to omit a more detailed discussion on the estimates regarding these control
variables in order to focus on more economically meaningful loan observables.
A concise summary of quantile regression results and how they conform with the model
is provided in Table 2.7. I conclude from this exercise that the model of mortgage shopping
and price discrimination is supported by the data and the empirical analysis. It is therefore
likely that borrowers in the U.S. government-backed mortgage markets are discriminated
because of their search costs.
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Table 2.7: Conformity of Regression Results with the Model’s Predictions
Loan Observables Observable Affiliated Cross-Quantile Relationship Results Conform
with Marginal Cost? of Estimated Coefficients with Model?
Credit Score X ↓ X
Original Principal Balance X ↓ X
Loan-to-Value X Non-zero Constant X
Debt Expense Ratio X ↓ X
Number of Borrowers X Approx. Zero X
Down-Payment Assistance X ↑ X
First-Time Buyer X ↓ X
Number of Units X ↑ X
2.6.5 Relationship between Loan Observables and Search Cost
The estimation results combined with the model provide additional insights into the re-
lationship between loan observables and consumer search costs. Taking the derivative of











Because ∂2pτ/∂s∂τ > 0, as shown in Appendix B.2, the sign of T̂sk should be the same
as the sign of ∂β̂kτ/∂τ . Hence, from Table 2.6, it is straightforward to determine if a loan
observable is positively or negatively related to search cost. Table 2.8 displays the results of
this exercise.
Most loan observables under consideration turns out to be negatively correlated with
search cost. The results conform with casual observations about the market for mortgages
in the US. Borrowers with a higher credit score and a lower debt expense ratio may be
more financially educated and therefore have smaller search cost for mortgages. Likewise,
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Table 2.8: Relationship between Loan Observables and Search Cost
Loan Observables ∂β̂kτ/∂τ Relationship with
Search Cost
Credit Score − −
Original Principal Balance − −
Loan-to-Value 0 0
Debt Expense Ratio − −
Number of Borrowers 0 0
Down-Payment Assistance + +
First-time Buyer − −
Number of Units + +
borrowers who have a higher original principal balance are likely to be more motivated to
engage in shopping. Perhaps interestingly, I also find that the loan-to-value ratio and the
number of borrowers undersigning the contract most likely are not correlated with search
costs. Whether the borrower obtains a down-payment assistance and the number of units
seem to be increasing with search costs. The results, even though only suggestive in nature,
may be helpful for businesses and policy-makers as search costs are rarely observed directly.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I formulate a theoretical model of mortgage pricing that includes elements
of consumer search and price discrimination. The model is then tested using recent data
on government-backed mortgages from September 2013 to December 2015. Estimates from
a quantile regression of transacted interest rates on loan observables are consistent with
predictions of the economic model.
I conclude in light of this evidence that the price distribution observed in U.S. mortgage
markets is consistent with the practice of price discrimination by mortgage lenders. Bor-
rowers with a higher search cost are charged a higher markup compared to those with a
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lower search cost, even when marginal cost is held constant. The paper is one of the first
to provide evidence of economic discrimination in the context of mortgage markets in the
United States.
We know from economic theory that the presence of price discrimination can have im-
portant implications on market welfare. Compared to the case of uniform pricing, price
discrimination can change total welfare level, as well as redistribute welfare between groups
of consumers and firms. Given that price discrimination is likely to exist in U.S. mort-
gage markets, a potential future research avenue would be to quantify the welfare effects of
discrimination and inform policies concerning this industry.
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Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 1
A.1 Standard Errors of Search Cost Cut-offs
The estimation described in Section 1.5 identifies N search cost cut-offs in any given market
with N lenders (including the cut-off of the highest quality lender, which is always 0).
Observed market shares identify the CDF values at the cut-offs G(cj), and markups identify
the cut-off levels for the N−1 lenders excluding the highest quality one. A question naturally
arises about how precise the estimated cut-offs and their CDF values are.
In order to provide some information regarding the preciseness of our estimation pro-
cedure, I employ the empirical bootstrap method to obtain standard errors around the
estimated search cost cut-offs. This section outlines how bootstrap samples are created and
the resulting estimates of standard errors.
The starting point is the loan-level dataset described in Section 1.3.2. For each lender in
each state, I keep the number of loans fixed, but replaced each original loan observation with
another one randomly drawn from the sample. Because the number of loans for each lender
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is kept unchanged, the market shares of lenders are kept fixed throughout the bootstrapping
procedure. On the other hand, estimated markups may change because randomly drawn loan
observations may have different interest rates and are tied with mortgage-backed securities
with a different market yield rate.
Keeping market shares fixed is necessary as observed markets at the state level have many
small lenders with low market shares who may disappear from the bootstrapped sample
otherwise. However, as market shares identify G(cj), these values also be constant across
different bootstrapped samples. Bootstrapping with fixed market shares allows us only to
examine errors in the cut-off values cj. In other words, we examine the asymptotic scenario
when the number of customers at each lender approaches infinity, but the relative shares
are the same. The bootstrapped confidence intervals represents the range over which our
procedure is likely to contain the true values of the cut-offs.
With the above caveats, I create 200 bootstrapped random samples from the loan-level
data and estimate cut-off ĉj separately for each sample. I compute the deviations in these
bootstrapped estimates ĉj. The range between the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of these deviations
represent the 95% confidence interval around our original estimates.
The estimated confidence intervals from this process are extremely tight. In Figure A.1a,
the search cost distribution in Texas and its 95% confidence intervals are zoomed in around
the median search cost value. The dashed lines represent the upper and lower bound of the
CDF. Both the lower and upper bounds, as well as the original CDF curve, are obtained by
fitting a log-normal CDF around estimated ĉj. As shown in this figure, both curves are very
close to each other and to the original CDF estimate. The tightness of the confidence intervals
suggests that there is little variation in the estimated markups of lenders across bootstrapped
samples. Figure A.1b confirms the preciseness of estimated markups. I calculate the standard
errors of estimated markets and graph a histogram of computed standard errors divided by
estimated markups. For the majority of lenders, the standard error is less 5% of the estimated
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markup. Because estimated markups seem to be precise, tight confidence intervals around
estimated search cost cut-offs can be explained.
(a) A Portion of the 95% Confidence Inter-
vals of Search Cost in Texas
(b) Histogram of S.E. divided by Estimated
Markups
Figure A.1: Estimated Standard Errors of Search Cost Cut-offs
A.2 Calculations of Profit, Quality, and Search Expen-
diture
A.2.1 Profit
Let Ms denote the number of loans in a state-level market s. Absolute markup mjs, as
described in Section 1.4, can be viewed as the profit for each loan that lender j in state s
originates. Therefore, total expected profit for lender j is:
Πjs = Ms ×msjs ×mjs
where msjs denotes the market share of lender j. Conceptually, the above equation is exactly
equation 1.7 in the text with the state-level subscript s added in for clarity. Then, average
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At the national level, I calculate average profit per loan as the market size weighted average





The numerator in the above formula is total profit at the national level.
A.2.2 Quality
In order to measure welfare effects resulting from a gain in the quality of lenders in the











To obtain per-loan transacted quality at the national level, I calculate the market size





The numerator in the above formula is total quality at the national level.
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A.2.3 Search Expenditure
As explained in the text, for a given search cost level si, total expected search cost for




where λi is the probability of success during each search instance. If si is repeatedly and ran-










Per-loan search expenditure at the national level would be the market size weighted average





The numerator in the above formula is total search expenditure at the national level.
A.3 Numerical Solver in the Counterfactual of Search
Cost Reductions
The primitives of the counterfactual exercise consist of the vector of lenders’ quality (δ1, . . . , δN)
and the distribution of consumer search cost with its CDF G(·) and PDF g(·). Given these
primitives, it is possible to solve for the optimal markups charged by all lenders in the mar-
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ket, except the highest quality one. The first-order conditions of lenders is a system of N−1
equations that could be solved for N − 1 markups. For j = {1, . . . , N − 1}:
∂msj
∂mj
×mj +msj = 0 (A.1)
In the above equation, market shares msj depend on the CDF G(c), and the market share
derivatives ∂msj/∂mj depend on the PDF g(c). The optimal stopping rule establishes c as a
function of lender quality δ and markup m. Because of this, it is possible to compute profit-
maximizing markups for N − 1 lenders in each market under the counterfactual scenarios of
search cost reduction.
Given G(·), g(·) and δ, I solve for optimal markups m using the numerical solver fsolve
in MATLAB. In figure A.2, I evaluate the performance of this numerical method by first com-
puting optimal markups under the original equilibrium with no search cost reductions. How
computed markups coincide with the actual, observed markups in the data is an indication
of fsolve’s reliability. In panel A.2a, I plot the computed markups against the observed
markups. This panel shows that at the firm-level, there is some discrepancy between com-
puted and observed markups, although they are clearly positively correlated. In panel A.2b,
I graph the histograms of computed and observed markups. I find that their distribution
shows similarities. From the two panels, I conclude that while it’s difficult to assess the rela-
tionship between computed and observed markups at the firm-level, it is still meaningful to
talk about them at the distributional level. I therefore employ fsolve in order to calculate
results for all counterfactual scenarios considered in the main text.
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(a) Scatter Plot (b) Histogram
Figure A.2: Computed and Actual Markups in the Original Equilibrium
A.4 Counterfactual of Search Cost Reductions
A.4.1 An Alternative Assumption on Markups: Lender N ’s Markup
Varies Proportionally with Search Cost Reductions
As explained in Section 1.7, the mortgage search model does not impose a first-order condi-
tion on the profit-maximizing behavior of the highest quality lender in each market. For this
lender (denoted by N), we know its profit-maximizing markup at the two extremes of search
cost reductions: when search costs are reduced by 0 or by 100 percents. In the main text, I
solve the model by assuming that lender N ’s markup is kept unchanged throughout all the
counterfactual scenarios. Here I consider an alternative assumption and specify lender N ’s





N −mr=0N )× r/100
where r = 10, 25, 50, 75, 90 denotes the percentage point reductions in search costs.
In Figures A.3 and A.4 I show the price effects of search cost reductions under this
alternative assumption on markups. These price effects are similar to what is presented in
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Figure A.3: Distribution of Changes in Average Markup following Search Cost Reductions
Section 1.7. Average markups shows a tendency to increase with search cost reductions up
until the extreme case of 100% reductions, where average markups decline. Price dispersion,
on the other hand, increases monotonically throughout the counterfactual scenarios, with
the most significant increase occurring in the full information scenario. These price effects
are qualitatively similar to those derived in Section 1.7. One explanation for the increase of
average markups is that the reductions of search costs by a certain percentage make search
costs more homogeneous across borrowers, and the model becomes closer to that described
by the Diamond paradox where all firms charge the monopoly price (Diamond, 1971).
As for the welfare effects, Tables A.1 and A.2 show calculation results at both the loan
level and the national level. We see that the alternative assumption on lenderN ’s markup has
a small impact on the welfare numbers. However, the results are qualitatively unchanged, as
99
Figure A.4: Distribution of Changes in Markup Dispersion following Search Cost Reductions
evidenced in Figure A.5. Profits show a slight increase; total transacted quality also increases,
while search expenditure decrease. As a result, social welfare increases monotonously. These
qualitative results are also found in Section 1.7.
Table A.1: Welfare Effects (in dollars) at the Loan Level
Search Cost Reduction 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
Profit 139 163 169 188 221 291 299
Total Quality 408 495 507 539 596 695 698
Search Expenditure 314 226 199 153 106 82 -
Social Welfare 94 270 308 386 489 614 698
See Appendix A.2 for how welfare quantities are calculated at the loan level.
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Table A.2: Total Welfare Effects (in million dollars) at the National Level
Search Cost Reduction 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
Profit 8.46 7.11 7.36 8.20 9.60 12.69 18.11
Total Quality 24.74 21.58 22.07 23.46 25.94 30.28 42.33
Search Expenditure 19.05 9.83 8.68 6.65 4.63 3.55 -
Social Welfare 5.69 11.75 13.40 16.81 21.31 26.72 42.33
Market size in each state is the average number of new loans each month from September
2013 to December 2015. See Appendix A.2 for how welfare quantities are calculated at
the national level.
A.4.2 An Alternative Assumption on Search Cost Reduction: Re-
ducing the Mean while Keeping the Variance Constant
In order to provide additional insights into how search cost reductions affect average markups,
I run a counterfactual scenario where the mean of search costs in each market is reduced
by 50%, while the variance is kept unchanged.1 As explained in Section 1.7, a reduction
in both the mean and variance of search costs may have opposing effects on average price.
Reducing the mean of search costs presumably would foster more intense price competition
and lower average price, while reducing the variance makes search costs more homogeneous
and induce firms to charge higher prices. This counterfactual provides evidence to support
this explanation.
In order to reduce the mean and keep the variance constant, I adjust the parameters of
the estimated log-normal distribution of search costs. Specifically, if the parameters of the
estimated search cost distribution in the original equilibrium is given by µ̂ and σ̂, I compute











[exp(M − ln 2)]2
1I thank Rich Sweeney for his suggestions on this counterfactual.
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Figure A.5: Welfare Effects (in dollars) at the Loan Level
where M = µ̂ + σ̂2/2. It can be verified that a log-normal distribution with parameters
(µ̃, σ̃) will have the same variance and half the mean as those of a log-normal distribution
with parameters (µ̂, σ̂).
Given the counterfactual search cost distributions with parameters (µ̃, σ̃), I re-optimize
the model and solve for the vector of optimal markups. As in the main text, I assume that
in each market, the markup of the highest quality lender is not changed when search costs
are reduced. I compute the average markup in each market in the counterfactual, and then
calculate the percentage change in average markup relative to the original equilibrium.
Figure A.6 shows a frequency count of how average markups in this counterfactual com-
pare to those in the original equilibrium. When only the mean of search cost is reduced and
not the variance, most markets experience a price decline; the histogram is skewed to the
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left of zero. Out of the 38 markets where the numerical solver succeeds in finding a solution,
29 markets experience decline in average markups. The magnitude of decline ranges from
a few percentage points to over 60 percents. Nine markets seem to have price increase in
this counterfactual, and some increases can be as significant as nearly 70% over the original
markups.
Given the price increase in these nine markets, one may think that the assumption about
lender N ’s markup being constant is not a good approximation in these cases. Alternatively,
it’s also possible that average markup is related to additional measures of heterogeneity in
search costs other than the variance, such as higher moments of the search cost distribution.
Unfortunately, both of these explanations for price increase can not readily be tested using
the current model and data.
Nevertheless, this counterfactual shows that the majority of markets experience a signif-
icant average price decline when only the mean of search costs is reduced. Some of these
declines are not observed when both the mean and variance are reduced as in Section 1.7,
where 25 out of 39 markets have price decline in the 50% reduction case. Moreover, the
magnitude of average markup decline is also higher when the variance of search costs is held
constant. In Section 1.7, the average price change is about -2.11% in the 50% reduction
case, whereas in the current counterfactual with constant variance, the average price change
is -15.1%. Thus, there is good reason to believe that the variance of search costs plays a role
in affecting average markups. If search costs become more homogeneous, average markups
would tend to rise.
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Appendices for Chapter 2
B.1 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Let Eπ(p, F ) be the expected profit when a lender charges p when the equilibrium price
distribution is F . Similarly to Stahl (1989), we can define a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
(SNE) as follows:
Definition. A distribution F (p) is a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) if and only if
Eπ(p, F ) is equal to a constant for all p in the support of F and not greater than that
constant for any p.
Proposition. The model, as described in Section 2.5, has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This proposition can be proved by arguing that the equilibrium price distribution
F is atomless. Suppose otherwise, and F has an atom at p̃, and the strategy of charging
p̃ is played with some positive probability. Given this price distribution F, a lender who
undercuts p̃ slightly would increase its probability of becoming the lowest price lender and
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capturing all the demand from shoppers. We have:
Eπ(p̃, F ) < Eπ(p̃− ε, F )
Therefore, a price distribution F with an atom at p̃ cannot be a SNE. Equivalently, the model
does not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A pure strategy may exist if shoppers vanish
from the model when µt = 0 (see Stahl (1996)), but we are excluding this case from our
analysis.
Proposition. There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which firms draw prices from an





Proof. The proof of existence is presented in Stahl (1996) (Theorem 3.1) and will not be
reproduced here. Instead, we will show that the support of F does not contain c, or that
p > c.
Suppose to the contrary that p = c. Let the expected share of customers purchasing from
a lender who charges price p be Ψ(p, F ). Then we have:
Eπ(p, F ) = (p− c)Ψ(p, F ) = 0
But the lender charging p can profitably increase profit by increasing its price slightly, because
Ψ(p+ ε, F ) > 0 for some ε > 0:
Eπ(p+ ε, F ) = (p+ ε− c)Ψ(p, F ) > 0
Thus, Eπ(p, F ) < Eπ(p+ ε, F ) and F is not a SNE, a contradiction. Hence p = c is not in
the support of F . In equilibrium, we should observe p > c, and lenders are making positive
profit.
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B.2 Partial Derivatives of Transacted Price
As in equation (2.4), the transaction price distribution is given by:


























For each quantile τ ∈ [0, 1], we can define an implicit function G:
G(p, c, s, µ) = F trans(p, c, s, µ)− τ = 0
Since F is the CDF of transacted prices, by definition p would be increasing in τ . We can
























The two partial derivatives with respect to marginal cost c and search cost s are algrebaically
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The partial derivate with respect to marginal cost is constant for all values of τ . The partial
derivative with respect to search cost is increasing in p, and because p is increasing in τ ,
∂p/∂s is increasing in τ as well. The difference in how these partial derivatives vary with τ
forms the basis of our empirical test, as discussed in Section 2.5.4.
































































































Since a lot of terms in the above equation are repeated (with changing exponents), the partial
















































































and obtain ∂p/∂µ using the Implicit Function Theorem. Unlike ∂p/∂c and ∂p/∂s, the
expression for ∂p/∂µ turns out to be quite challenging to simplify. We therefore adopt a
more heuristic approach to examine how ∂p/∂µ varies with p and τ .














γ(1− A)(1 + µ
1−µN)
It is then straightforward to derive the partial derivatives of price boundaries with respect

















































The first three equations confirm our results earlier that the partial derivative of price is
constant with respect to marginal cost, and is increasing with respect to search cost (since
1 + µ
1−µN > 1, it follows that ∂p̄/∂s > ∂p/∂s). As for the partial derivative with respect to






















< 0 and A < 1, the left-hand side is negative and the right-hand side is positive.
For all values of µ and N , the sufficient condition is satisfied, hence ∂p̄/∂µ < ∂p/∂µ.
We have established that the partial derivative of price with respect to µ is smaller at
the upper-bound than at the lower-bound of the price support. To check if this ∂p/∂µ is
indeed decreasing over the whole support of price, we graph it against price for different
combinations of values for N and µ. As Figure B.1 shows, the relationship between ∂p/∂µ
and price is monotonically decreasing over the whole support of price regardless of the values
chosen for N and µ. We therefore find it plausible that ∂p/∂µ is decreasing in price, and
equivalently also in τ , for all values of N and µ.
Figure B.1: The Relationship between ∂p/∂µ and price
B.3 Linearity of Quantile Regressions
The first derivative of transacted price with respect to search cost, solved in Appendix B.2,








Letting y = pτ and x = s, we have
y = c+ y′x
Differentiating this equation yields
y′ = y′ + y′′x
implying that y′′ = 0 and hence, y must be linear in x. Letting y = α + βx we have
α + βx = c+ βx
The above equation is satisfied for any β when α = c. We can thus express the relationship
between transacted price, marginal cost, and search cost as:
pτ = c+ βs
Thus, the dependence of transacted price on the number of firms N and the fraction of
shoppers µ must occur through β:
pτ = c+ β(τ,N, µ)s
The above equation shows that the linear form of the quantile regression equations used
in the empirical analysis is actually consistent with the modeling assumptions. It is also
consistent with our earlier calculations that ∂pτ/∂c = 1.
112
B.4 Quantile Regressions with Simulated Data
In this Appendix, I use simulated data in order to examine the results of quantile regressions
of transacted rates on marginal cost, search cost, and the fraction of shoppers. To generate
the data, I set the number of firms N = 20, which is the average number of mortgage
lenders observed in each state-level market. I also assume that there are 10 different types of
consumers and the fraction of shoppers µ = 0.25. I examine three separate scenarios: when
marginal cost is constant, positively correlated with search cost, and negatively correlated
with search cost.
In each of the scenarios, the generation of simulated data relies on the CDF of transacted
prices as given in equation (2.4). I first generate a list of 1000 probability values using a
standard uniform distribution with the support [0, 1]. For each of these probability values,
I solve for the transacted price such that the CDF in equation (2.4) is equal to the given
probability value. The calculation is repeated for each of the 10 customer types, and under
ideal circumstances, there should be 1000×10 = 10, 000 observations of simulated transacted
price in each scenario.
I rely on a numerical method to solve for transacted price given a probability value of
the CDF. Specifically, I use the solver fsolve in MATLAB in order to numerically solve for
transacted price, and then drop observations for which the solver fails to obtain a solution.
In general, the solver succeeds about half of the times. For this reason, the simulated dataset
of transacted price always has less than 10,000 observations in each scenario. The numerical
solver is chosen because solving analytically for the transacted price requires inverting the
CDF equation. This inversion is difficult given the form of equation (2.4).
In each of the following scenarios, I consider a quantile regression of transacted prices on
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search cost and fraction of shoppers:
Qτ (pi | si, µi) = β0τ + β1τsi + β2τmci (B.1)
As predicted by the model, we would expect that as τ increases, β1τ is increasing and β2τ
is approximately equals to 1 (see equations (2.5), (2.7), and (2.6)). These predictions are
supported by regression results in all of the three scenarios.
B.4.1 Scenario 1: Constant and Zero Marginal Cost
In this scenario, the marginal cost parameter is constant and zero (cθ = 0) for all consumer
types θ. I use MATLAB’s function rand (with the seed set to 2) in order to generate a random
sequence of decreasing numbers from 3 to 0.5 to be used as search costs. Table B.1 lists
these values of search cost that are then used to simulate the data.
Quantile regression results are presented in Table B.2. We see that the predictions of the
model on the quantile regression coefficients are confirmed. All estimates are significant at
the 1% level.
Table B.1: Data Generating Parameters
Consumer Type (θ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Search Cost (s) 2.05 1.87 1.59 1.59 1.55 1.33 1.25 1.17 1.01 0.56
Table B.2: Quantile Regression of Transacted Price
Transacted Price Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Search Cost 1.39* 1.63* 1.85* 8.06* 10.12*
(0.04) (0.14) (0.57) (0.27) (0.002)
Number of Observations 5102 5102 5102 5102 5102
*: significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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B.4.2 Marginal Cost Positively Correlated with Search Cost
I then consider a scenario where marginal costs are chosen such as they are positively cor-
related with search cost. For the 10 consumer types θ, I generate equally spaced marginal
costs ranging from 1 to 28. This range is chosen after heuristic tests in order to maxi-
mize the numerical solver’s ability to solve for transacted price. Search cost parameters are
unchanged from the previous scenario. Table B.3 displays the data generating parameters.
Using the data generated with these parameters, I run the quantile regression equation (B.1)
and report the results in Table B.4.
Predictions of the model regarding ∂p/∂s and ∂p/∂c are again confirmed. The marginal
effect of search cost on transacted price is increasing in the quantile value of price. The
marginal effect of marginal cost is equal to 1 throughout (the 95% confidence interval of β2τ
encompasses 1 in all columns of Table B.4).
Table B.3: Data Generating Parameters
Consumer Type (θ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Search Cost (s) 2.05 1.87 1.59 1.59 1.55 1.33 1.25 1.17 1.01 0.56
Marginal Cost (c) 28 25 22 19 16 13 10 7 4 1
Table B.4: Quantile Regression of Transacted Price
Transacted Price Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Search Cost 1.38* 2.05* 4.74* 9.14* 10.11*
(0.10) (0.47) (1.73) (0.80) (0.02)
Marginal Cost 1.00* 1.00* 1.01* 1.06* 1.00*
(0.004) (0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.001)
Number of Observations 5263 5263 5263 5263 5263
*: significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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B.4.3 Marginal Cost Negatively Correlated with Search Cost
Finally, I consider the case when marginal cost is negatively correlated with search cost.
I keep the parameter values of search cost and marginal cost from scenario 2, but reorder
marginal cost values such that they are decreasing in search cost. Table B.5 lists the data
generating parameters, and Table B.6 reports the quantile regression results.
The results in this case are also consistent with predictions of the model regarding ∂p/∂s
and ∂p/∂c. For ∂p/∂s, the only notable estimate is that of the median regression, where
the point estimate is about 1. However, this estimate is not significant and has a wide 95%
confidence interval (ranging from -4.63 to 6.65). If its true value is closer to the upper-bound
of this range, it will ensure that ∂p/∂s is increasing across quantile values.
The point estimates for ∂p/∂mc, although not remarkably close to 1 in the 0.25, 0.50, and
0.75 regressions, all have confidence intervals that encompasses 1. I therefore cannot reject
that their true value is 1 at the 5% level. I suspect that increasing the sample size would
bring the point estimates closer to 1, but that can be very expensive in terms of computing
power. Nevertheless, even with the current sample size, the model is not rejected.
Table B.5: Data Generating Parameters
Consumer Type (θ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Search Cost (s) 2.05 1.87 1.59 1.59 1.55 1.33 1.25 1.17 1.01 0.56
Marginal Cost (c) 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28
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Table B.6: Quantile Regression of Transacted Price
Transacted Price Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Search Cost 1.55* 1.67** 1.00 7.26* 10.20*
(0.19) (0.79) (2.87) (2.22) (0.06)
Marginal Cost 1.00* .97* 0.83* 0.91* 1.00*
(0.007) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09) (0.002)
Number of Observations 4079 4079 4079 4079 4079
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